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INTRODUCTION
Unlike many types of domestic arbitration where unreasoned awards
(often called “standard awards”) are the norm, international commercial
arbitration routinely requires arbitrators to produce fully reasoned
awards.1 However, very little information exists as to what constitutes a
reasoned award in the international commercial context2 or how to write
such an award.3 This lacuna is extremely problematic given the ever-in-
creasing number of international commercial arbitrations that arise every
year4 and the significant individual and societal costs that can result from a
1. See Rain CII Carbon, LLC v. ConocoPhillips Co., 674 F.3d 469, 473-74 (5th Cir.
2012) (distinguishing a standard award from a reasoned award); Cat Charter, LLC v.
Schurtenberger, 646 F.3d 836, 844-46 (11th Cir. 2011) (same); see also S.I. STRONG, INTERNA-
TIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A GUIDE FOR U.S. JUDGES 22 (2012) (comparing inter-
national commercial arbitration to other forms of arbitration), http://www.fjc.gov [hereinafter
STRONG, GUIDE].
2. See Rain CII Carbon, 674 F.3d at 473-74; Cat Charter, 646 F.3d at 844-46; GARY B.
BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 3037-45 (2014). The debate about what
constitutes a reasoned award extends to investment arbitration as well. See Tai-Heng Cheng
& Robert Trisotto, Reasons and Reasoning in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 32 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 409, 409 (2009); Jason Webb Yackee, The Reasons Requirement in Inter-
national Investment Arbitration: Critical Case Studies, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 629, 630 (2009)
(book review).
3. A few materials are available, although most are relatively short and provide only
general advice. See generally George A. Bermann, Writing the Award – An Arbitrator’s Per-
spective, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CHECKLISTS 171 (Grant Hanessian & Lawrence
W. Newman eds., 2009); Thomas Bingham, Reasons and Reasons for Reasons, 4 ARB. INT’L
141 (1988); Thomas J. Brener et al., Awards and Substantive Interlocutory Arbitral Decisions,
in COLLEGE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATORS GUIDE TO BEST PRACTICES IN COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 225, 237-39 (James M. Gaitis et al. eds., 2014); Daniel L. FitzMaurice & Mau-
reen O’Connor, Preparing a Reasoned Award, 14 ARIAS U.S. Q. (2007); Marcel Fontaine,
Drafting the Award – A Perspective from a Civil Law Jurist, 5 ICC COURT BULL. 30 (1994);
Humphrey Lloyd, Writing Awards – A Common Lawyer’s Perspective, 5 ICC COURT BULL.
38 (1994); Humphrey Lloyd et al., Drafting Awards in ICC Arbitrations, 16 ICC COURT
BULL. 19 (2005); William W. Park, Arbitrators and Accuracy, 1 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 25
(2010); Jose Maria Alonso Puig, Deliberation and Drafting Awards in International Arbitra-
tion, in LIBER AMICORUM BERNARDO CREMADES 131, 144-58 (Miguel Ángel Fernández-
Ballesteros & David Arias eds. 2010); Nicholas C. Ulmer, Language, Truth, and Arbitral
Accuracy, 28 J. INT’L ARB. 295 (2011).
4. International commercial arbitration is the preferred means of resolving cross-bor-
der business disputes. See BORN, supra note 2, at 73; see also S.I. Strong, Border Skirmishes:
The Intersection Between Litigation and International Commercial Arbitration, 2012 J. DISP.
RESOL. 1, 2-3, 5-6 [hereinafter Strong, Border Skirmishes] (noting an increase in arbitral pro-
ceedings over the last fifty years). More generalists are entering the world of arbitration as
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badly written award.5 Indeed, much of the current debate about the need
for appellate arbitration stems from controversies generated by awards
that fail to provide reasoning that is sufficiently persuasive to the losing
party.6
Helping arbitrators write awards that are clear, concise and coherent
is vitally important if international commercial arbitration is to retain its
place as the preferred means of resolving cross-border business disputes.7
However, that task is not as easy as it sounds.
First, the relative scarcity of published awards means that novice arbi-
trators have very little to look at in the way of models.8 Furthermore,
many of the materials that are publicly available are typically offered only
in excerpted, digested or translated form and may not be suitable for use
as prototypes.9 While arbitrators could seek guidance from other types of
advocates and arbitrators, which may affect the quality and nature of international award
writing. See id. at 4.
5. Badly written awards (which in this context means those that provide insufficient
reasoning as opposed to those that reach the “wrong” conclusion) can not only diminish
parties’ and society’s faith in the legitimacy of the arbitral process, they can also increase the
time and cost associated with final resolution of a dispute, both by taking a long time to write
and by increasing the chance for a successful challenge to the award. See BORN, supra note 2,
at 3044; see also Herbert L. Marx Jr., Who Are Labor Arbitration Awards Written For? And
Other Musings About Award Writing, 58 DISP. RESOL. J. 22, 23 (May-July 2003). Rising costs
and delays have jeopardized the future of international commercial arbitration, and parties
are now considering the viability of other dispute resolution alternatives, such as interna-
tional commercial mediation. See S.I. Strong, Beyond International Commercial Arbitration?
The Promise of International Commercial Mediation, 45 WASH. U. J. L & POL’Y 11, 12
(2014); S.I. Strong, Reasoned Rationality: An Empirical Assessment of International Commer-
cial Mediation, (forthcoming 2016).
6. See Irene M. Ten Cate, International Arbitration and the Ends of Appellate Review,
44 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1109, 1111 (2012) (noting that the primary impetus for arbitral
appeals in international commercial arbitration is error correction). Badly written awards,
like badly written judicial decisions and opinions, fail to persuade the reader that the out-
come is correct and therefore generate the desire for an appeal. See S.I. Strong, Writing
Reasoned Decisions and Opinions: A Guide for Novice, Experienced and Foreign Judges,
2015 J. DISP. RESOL. 93, 107 [hereinafter Strong, Writing].
7. See BORN, supra note 2, at 73.
8. See Albert Jan van den Berg, Dissenting Opinions by Party-Appointed Arbitrators
in Investment Arbitration, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN 821, 821 n.4 (Mahnoush Arsanjani et al. eds. 2010) (“[I]t is
uncommon to publish international commercial awards. . . .”). Although a number of arbitral
institutions have been publishing denatured (anonymized) awards for decades, those materi-
als are not widely available, since they are found only in specialized reporting series that are
difficult and expensive to find. See S.I. STRONG, RESEARCH AND PRACTICE IN INTERNA-
TIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: SOURCES AND STRATEGIES 44-45, 83-85 (2009) [herein-
after STRONG, RESEARCH] (listing sources for arbitral awards and noting that databases
offered by generalist providers such as Westlaw and LexisNexis generally do not include the
necessary information).
9. See Lloyd et al., supra note 3, at 20; see also James M. Gaitis, International and
Domestic Arbitration Procedure: The Need for a Rule Providing a Limited Opportunity for
Arbitral Reconsideration of Reasoned Awards, 15 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 9, 17 (2004) (discuss-
ing why reasoned awards can vary widely). There are no groups responsible for identifying
those arbitral awards that are particularly noteworthy from a structural or linguistic perspec-
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reasoned rulings that are more widely available (such as awards generated
in investment arbitration10 or reasoned decisions from national courts11),
not all of those procedures are truly analogous to international commer-
cial arbitration.12
tive, although a brief review of recently published awards demonstrates a number of exam-
ples of good writing. See Contractor v. Producer (Zam. v. Zam.), International Chamber of
Commerce Case No. 16484, Final Award (2011), XXXIX Y.B. COMM. ARB. 216 (2014); Con-
sortium Member v. Consortium Leader (It. v. Neth.), International Chamber of Commerce
Case No. 14630, Final Award, XXXVII Y.B. COMM. ARB. 90 (2012). The situation is quite
different in the judicial realm, where exemplary judicial writing is identified regularly. See
Exemplary Legal Writing, THE GREEN BAG ALMANAC & READER, http://www.greenbag.org/
green_bag_press/almanacs/almanacs.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2016) (listing the best judicial
opinions in the United States each year); see also WILLIAM DOMNARSKI, IN THE OPINION OF
THE COURT 97-98 (1997).
10. Numerous investment awards are now publicly available as a result of the move
toward increased transparency. See Award – ICISD Convention Arbitration, INTERNATIONAL
CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES (ICSID), https://icsid.worldbank.org/
apps/ICSIDWEB/process/Pages/Award-Convention-Arbitration.aspx (last visited Feb. 6,
2016) (noting the presumption toward full or partial publication of investment awards); see
also Gary Born, A New Generation of International Adjudication, 61 DUKE L.J. 775, 841-42
(2012); Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing
Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1621, 1611-
12 (2005).
11. Reasoned judicial decisions exist in both civil law and common law countries, al-
though there are some differences between the types of judicial opinions generated by com-
mon law courts and civil law courts. See Allen Shoenberger, Change in the European Civil
Law Systems: Infiltration of the Anglo-American Case Law System of Precedent Into the Civil
Law System, 55 LOY. L. REV. 5, 5 (2009); see also infra notes 58-61, 221-222 and accompany-
ing text. For example, judges in civil law countries often do not undertake the same type of
factual analysis as judges in common law countries because of the civil law’s emphasis on
deductive rather than inductive reasoning. See S.I. STRONG ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW FOR
BILINGUAL LAWYERS: WORKING ACROSS THE ENGLISH-SPANISH DIVIDE / DERECHO COM-
PARADO PARA ABOGADOS HISPANO Y ANGLOPARLANTES ch. 3 (forthcoming 2016) (noting
that whereas “the civil law . . . uses deductive reasoning to move from general principles of
law to particular outcomes in specific cases, the common law uses analogical or inductive
reasoning to generate general principles of law as a result of legal conclusions generated in
large numbers of individual disputes”); Julie Bédard, Transsystemic Teaching of Law at Mc-
Gill: “Radical Changes, Old and New Hats,” 27 QUEEN’S L.J. 237, 269-70 (2001).
12. See Strong, Writing, supra note 6, at 101-06 (discussing purposes of judicial opin-
ions and decisions); see also infra notes 67-84 and accompanying text (concerning differences
between arbitration and litigation). For example, the quasi-public nature of investment arbi-
tration and the strong influence of international law means that investment awards often
resemble opinions generated by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). See Born, supra
note 10, at 780-81; Thomas Buergenthal, Lawmaking by the ICJ and Other International
Courts, 103 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 403, 405 (2009) (noting investment awards often rely
on decisions from the ICJ); see also Ernest A. Young, Supranational Rulings as Judgments
and Precedents, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 477, 491-96 (2008) (suggesting that interna-
tional arbitral awards are enforced more readily than judgments of international tribunals);
compare Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Croat. v. Serb.), Judgment, (Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/118/
18422.pdf, with Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic (Arg. v. It.), Decision on
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/9 (Feb. 8, 2013), http://
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1276.pdf.
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Second, new arbitrators typically come to their duties with very little
in the way of formal training.13 Indeed, the underlying assumption is that
anyone appointed to an ad hoc tribunal or to an arbitral roster is already
competent to serve as an arbitrator as a result of that person’s extensive
experience as counsel.14 Interestingly, this reliance on selection proce-
dures rather than on training is similar to the educational model adopted
by the judicial systems of many common law countries.15 In those jurisdic-
tions, judges are selected from a pool of experienced lawyers and placed
on the bench with very little specialized training, based on the assumption
that anyone who has become a top litigator is naturally competent to take
on the role of a judge.16 However, research into judicial education and
performance has demonstrated that the skills associated with serving as an
adjudicator are significantly different than those associated with acting as
an advocate.17 The transition to the bench is particularly difficult with re-
spect to the task of writing fully reasoned rulings, with many new judges
finding the “move from advocacy to decision, from marshalling and
presenting evidence to fact-finding and synthesizing,” to be extremely
challenging.18 As a result, it appears inaccurate to claim, as some authori-
13. A number of universities have attempted to provide advanced training in arbitra-
tion, but most of those courses focus on preparing advocates rather than arbitrators. See, e.g.,
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON COLLEGE OF LAW, CENTER ON INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, https://www.wcl.american.edu/arbitration/ (last visited Feb. 5,
2016); COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL & INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION, RELATED CURRICULUM AT COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL, http://
web.law.columbia.edu/center-for-international-arbitration/curriculum (last visited Feb. 5,
2016); MIDS-GENEVA L.L.M. IN INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION, CURRICULUM,
http://www.mids.ch/the-program/curriculum/gneral-courses/first-general-course.html (last vis-
ited Feb. 5, 2016); QUEEN MARY, UNIVERSITY OF LONDON, SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION, SPECIALIST PROGRAMMES, http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/courses/in
dex.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2016) [hereinafter QMUL]; UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI, L.L.M. IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS, http://www.law.miami.edu/aca
demics/international-arbitration-institute/lectures-courses (last visited Feb. 5, 2016). In the
one case where a course on award writing is offered, it is limited to a single session. See
QMUL, supra (describing one-day short course on award writing in international
arbitration).
14. See STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 1, at 7-9 (discussing institutional arbitration and
ad hoc arbitration). Although most arbitral institutions require some training when a new
arbitrator joins their roster, those programs focus heavily on administrative issues relating to
that particular institution. Some substantive elements may be offered, but not in any detail.
15. See Emily Kadens, The Puzzle of Judicial Education: The Case of Chief Justice
William de Grey, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 143, 143-45 (2009); Charles H. Koch, Jr., The Advan-
tages of the Civil Law Judicial Design as the Model for Emerging Legal Systems, 11 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 139, 143 (2004). The situation in civil law countries is very different.
There, judges are given instruction in judicial writing from the very beginning of their legal
careers. See Kadens, supra, at 143-45; Koch, supra, at 143.
16. See Kadens, supra note 15, at 143-45; Koch, supra note 15, at 143.
17. See Kadens, supra note 15, at 143.
18. Jeffrey A. Van Detta, The Decline and Fall of the American Judicial Opinion, Part
I: Back to the Future From the Roberts Court to Learned Hand – Context and Congruence, 12
BARRY L. REV. 53, 55 (2009) [hereinafter Van Detta 1]. Indeed, U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Hugo Black, one of the most influential writers to ever grace the bench, once said that “the
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ties have, that international arbitrators can gain the necessary skillset sim-
ply through “observation, exposure, participation and experience.”19
This is not to say that arbitrators are entirely without resources, since
new and experienced arbitrators can seek out courses in award writing
from any one of a variety of institutions specializing in international com-
mercial arbitration.20 However, the current approach is problematic in
several ways.21
First, it is not clear how many new or experienced arbitrators capital-
ize on the opportunity to study award writing.22 Although some organiza-
tions require their members to undertake continuing education in
arbitration, that requirement is usually minimal (one one-hour course per
year may suffice) and does not mandate instruction in any particular sub-
ject.23 Given the various pressures facing both new and experienced arbi-
trators,24 it is perhaps understandable that arbitrators overlook courses in
writing, particularly since many arbitrators may feel that after decades of
work as practicing lawyers, they are already competent writers.25 How-
ever, many people do not appreciate the extent to which award writing
differs from other forms of communication.26
most difficult thing about coming on to the Court was learning to write.” DOMNARSKI, supra
note 9, at 36 (citation omitted).
19. See Doug Jones, Acquisition of Skills and Accreditation in International Arbitra-
tion, 22 ARB. INT’L 275, 281 (2006).
20. See, e.g., CHARTERED INSTITUTE OF ARBITRATORS (CIARB), https://www.ciarb.
org/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2016) (offering courses in award writing); AMERICAN ARBITRATION
ASSOCIATION (AAA), COURSE CALENDAR, https://www.aaau.org/courses (last visited Feb. 5,
2016) (same).
21. Commentators have suggested that the field of international commercial arbitra-
tion is under-regulated in a variety of ways. See Catherine A. Rogers, The Vocation of the
International Arbitrator, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 957, 970 n.40 (2005) [hereinafter Rogers,
Vocation].
22. Although a number of organizations (such as the AAA and CIArb) require
mandatory training on award writing, that requirement is usually limited to a single course
upon joining the organization or its roster.
23. See Jones, supra note 19, at 288; Rogers, Vocation, supra note 21, at 978. This
system is again remarkably similar to judicial education in common law countries, although
that approach has been criticized in a number of ways. See S.I. Strong, Judicial Education and
Regulatory Capture: Does the Current System of Educating Judges Promote a Well-Function-
ing Judiciary and Adequately Serve the Public Interest?, 2015 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 2-5 [hereinaf-
ter Strong, Judicial Education]; Strong, Writing, supra note 6, at 95-97.
24. Many arbitrators must not only juggle very busy dockets but must also learn a
variety of new skills, ranging from the ability to manage difficult counsel and witnesses to
issues relating to the type of evidence to allow or disallow. See Jones, supra note 19, at 281;
AAA, COURSE CALENDAR, https://www.adreducation.org/courses (last visited Feb. 5, 2016)
(demonstrating the scope of courses available to arbitrators).
25. Of course, it is possible that new arbitrators suffer from the Lake Wobegone Effect
with respect to their writing skills. See Garrison Keillor, The Lake Wobegone Effect, A PRAI-
RIE HOME COMPANION (Apr. 1, 2013), http://prairiehome.org/2013/04/the_lake_wobegon_ef-
fect/ (noting that all the children in Lake Woebegone are above average).
26. See Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 479, 503-06 (2013); Van Detta 1, supra note 18, at 55.
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Arbitrators who have worked previously as judges may be particularly
disinclined to take courses in award writing, based on the belief that they
already know how to write reasoned decisions.27 However, arbitral awards
are in many ways different than judicial opinions, and skills learned in the
judicial context may not translate into the arbitral setting.28
Current practice regarding continuing education on award writing suf-
fers from other problems as well. For example, most arbitral institutions
only ask established arbitrators to act as faculty, presumably based on the
belief that arbitrators are the only ones who have the skills and insights
necessary to teach other arbitrators.29 Not only can this practice create a
number of self-reinforcing behaviors within the field as faculty members
emphasize issues that they consider to be important with little input from
external or empirical sources,30 but most arbitrators are not especially
qualified to teach writing, despite their practical experience in arbitra-
tion.31 As a result, many award writing seminars end up focusing on per-
sonal anecdotes, basic writing techniques or logistical concerns that do not
address the deeper challenge of producing fully reasoned awards.32
Many of these educational practices mirror those traditionally seen in
common law forms of judicial education.33 Although those similarities
might lead some observers to conclude that the existing approach to arbi-
trator education is sufficient, commentators have sharply criticized the
27. See Bryan A. Garner, Why Lawyers Can’t Write, ABA J. (Mar. 1, 2013), http://
www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/why_lawyers_cant_write (discussing problems of law-
yers’ overconfidence); Strong, Judicial Education, supra note 23, at 10 (discussing problems
of judges’ overconfidence).
28. See infra notes 67-84 and accompanying text. Furthermore, it cannot be assumed
that every judge writes well. See Mark Painter, No Mercy for Poorly Written Opinions, WISC.
L.J., Sept. 10, 2010, http://wislawjournal.com/2010/09/10/no-mercy-for-poorly-written-opin
ions/.
29. Many common law countries use a similar approach to judicial education, although
that approach has been criticized. See Strong, Judicial Education, supra note 23, at 2-5.
30. C.f. Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law; The Course and Pattern of
Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 628-29 (2001); Catherine A.
Rogers, The Arrival of the “Have-Nots” in International Arbitration, 8 NEV. L.J. 341, 383
(2007) [hereinafter Rogers, Have-Nots] (noting the risk that international commercial arbi-
tration may become autopoietic).
31. The same issues exist in many forms of judicial education. See Strong, Judicial
Education, supra note 23, at 1. Many people cling to the belief that good writing cannot be
taught, either because writing is an innate skill or because the range of opinions about what
constitutes good writing is too diverse to support a single standardized treatment. See S.I.
STRONG, HOW TO WRITE LAW EXAMS AND ESSAYS 1-2 (4th ed. 2014) [hereinafter STRONG,
HOW TO WRITE]. While it is certainly true that good writing can vary a great deal in terms of
form, tone and style, that does not mean that it is impossible to identify certain common
features that exist in all good legal decisions and opinions. See generally LOUISE MAILHOT &
JAMES D. CARNWATH, DECISIONS, DECISIONS . . . A HANDBOOK FOR JUDICIAL WRITING 100
(1998) (discussing judicial writing); DOMNARSKI, supra note 9, at 55-74, 90-115.
32. See, e.g., Marx, supra note 5, at 22-23. This type of approach is also evident in
materials relating to judicial writing. See Strong, Writing, supra note 6, at 95-97.
33. See Strong, Writing, supra note 6, at 95-97; see also supra notes 15-32 and accompa-
nying text.
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common law judicial education model.34 This phenomenon, when com-
bined with the various concerns enunciated within the arbitral community
about the qualifications of international commercial arbitrators, suggests
that the existing approach to arbitrator education needs to be changed,
particularly with respect to the issue of award writing.35
Indeed, these issues suggest there is a critical need for more rigorous
analysis regarding the reasoned award requirement in international com-
mercial arbitration.36 This Article attempts to meet that need by scrutiniz-
ing the elements of a reasoned award in international commercial
arbitration and providing both experienced and novice arbitrators with a
structured and content-based approach to writing such awards.37 Method-
ologically, the discussion draws heavily on the large body of material in-
volving the use and drafting of reasoned judicial rulings in both common
law and civil law jurisdictions.38 However, the analysis only draws those
34. See LIVINGSTON ARMYTAGE, EDUCATING JUDGES: TOWARDS A NEW MODEL OF
CONTINUING JUDICIAL LEARNING (1996); Strong, Judicial Education, supra note 23, at 2-5.
35. See Jones, supra note 19, at 275. The decreased emphasis on arbitrator education
has led many parties to equate experience as an international arbitrator with competence as
an international arbitrator, thereby making it difficult for new arbitrators to enter the field.
See Wendy Miles, International Arbitrator Appointment: One vs. Three, Lawyer vs. Nonlaw-
yer, 57 DISP. RESOL. J. 36, 37 (Aug.-Oct. 2002) (quoting REDFERN & HUNTER, LAW AND
PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 205 (3rd. ed. 2004)); Rogers, Vo-
cation, supra note 21, at 967.
36. This is a subject that appears particularly suitable for a written guide, since this
form allows arbitrators to review the material at their own speed and in the manner that is
most useful to them. For example, arbitrators, like judges, “are generally autonomous [as
learners], entirely self-directed, and exhibit an intensely short-term problem-orientation in
their preferred learning practices.” ARMYTAGE, supra note 34, at 149.
37. This Article focuses on matters relating to final awards on the merits and does not
consider the special issues relating to the writing of a procedural order, an award arising out
of an arbitral challenge, a consent award or an interim or partial award, although some com-
mentators have discussed such matters. See, e.g., INT’L COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRA-
TION (ICCA), REPORT NO. 2: THE ICCA DRAFTING SOURCEBOOK FOR LOGISTICAL
MATTERS IN PROCEDURAL ORDERS (2015); Lloyd et al., supra note 3, at 38-40; Margaret
Moses, Reasoned Decisions in Arbitrator Challenges, III Y.B. INT’L ARB. 199 (2013); Rolf
Trittmann, When Should Arbitrators Issue Interim or Partial Awards and/or Procedural Or-
ders, 20 J. INT’L ARB. 255 (2003). This Article also does not address the special nature of
investment arbitration, which carries its own unique concerns as a result of its quasi-public
nature. See Cheng & Trisotto, supra note 2, at 409. However, a number of the issues discussed
herein apply to these other sorts of writings to the same extent as to final awards in interna-
tional commercial arbitration. See Fontaine, supra note 3, at 30.
38. See Ruth C. Vance, Judicial Opinion Writing: An Annotated Bibliography, 17 LE-
GAL WRITING J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 197, 204-31 (2011) (listing authorities); see, e.g., FED-
ERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, JUDICIAL OPINION WRITING MANUAL (1991), http://www.fjc.gov/
public/pdf.nsf/lookup/judiwrit.pdf/$file/judiwrit.pdf; LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE
OF JUDGES (1993); Samuel A. Alito, Jr. et al., Panel Remarks, The Second Conversation with
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr.: Lawyering and the Craft of Judicial Opinion Writing, 37 PEPP. L.
REV. 33 (2009); Richard B. Cappalli, Improving Appellate Opinions, 83 JUDICATURE 286
(May-June 2000); Elizabeth Ahlgren Francis, The Elements of Ordered Opinion Writing, 38
JUDGES J. 8 (Spring 1999); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV.
777 (2001); Joseph Kimble, First Things First: The Lost Art of Summarizing, 38 CT. REV. 30
(Summer 2001); Douglas K. Norman, An Outline for Appellate Opinion Writing, 39 JUDGES
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analogies that are appropriate, since arbitration and litigation are not
identical.39
Although this Article is aimed primarily at specialists in international
commercial arbitration, the material is also useful to numerous other indi-
viduals. For example, the information contained herein can be used to as-
sist judges involved in enforcing reasoned awards domestically or
internationally,40 scholars studying arbitral decision-making,41 arbitrators
and tribunal secretaries involved in the drafting of individual awards,42
and domestic arbitrators seeking to understand what a reasoned award is
under national law.43
J. 26 (Summer 2000); Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1455 (1995);
Strong, Writing, supra note 6, at 93; Timothy P. Terrell, Organizing Clear Opinions: Beyond
Logic to Coherence and Character, 38 JUDGES J. 4 (Spring 1999); Patricia M. Wald, A Reply
to Judge Posner, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1451 (1995); Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results
and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writing, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371 (1995); Nancy A.
Wanderer, Writing Better Opinions: Communicating with Candor, Clarity, and Style, 54 ME.
L. REV. 47 (2002); James Boyd White, What’s an Opinion For? 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1363
(1995); Charles R. Wilson, How Opinions Are Developed in the United States Court of Ap-
peals of the Eleventh Circuit, 32 STETSON L. REV. 247 (2003); infra notes 192-363 (listing
sources).
39. See infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
40. See BORN, supra note 2, at 3037-48.
41. Scholarship concerning international commercial arbitration is expanding at a phe-
nomenal rate. See STRONG, RESEARCH, supra note 8, at 88-137.
42. Discussion about the role of a tribunal secretary has become heated in recent
years, particularly with respect to the question of whether and to what extent a tribunal
secretary may assist in the drafting of an award. See ICCA, ICCA REPORT NO. 1: YOUNG
ICCA GUIDE ON ARBITRAL SECRETARIES (2015); Joint Report of the Int’l Commercial Dis-
putes Comm. and the Comm. on Arbitration of the N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n, Secretaries to Interna-
tional Arbitral Tribunals, 17 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 575, 576 (2006); Lloyd et al., supra note 3,
at 21; Emilia Onyema, The Role of the International Arbitral Tribunal Secretary, 9
VINDOBONA J. INT’L COMM. L. & ARB. 99, 100 (2005); see also Michael Polkinghorne, Differ-
ent Strokes for Different Folks? The Role of the Tribunal Secretary, KLUWER ARBITRATION
BLOG (May 17, 2014), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2014/05/17/different-strokes-for-
different-folks-the-role-of-the-tribunal-secretary-2/. This Article takes no position on that is-
sue but simply notes that it is possible that such a role may evolve over time, just as the role
of judicial clerks has evolved to include assisting judges with drafting judicial opinions and
decisions. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, LAW CLERK HANDBOOK: A HANDBOOK FOR
LAW CLERKS TO FEDERAL JUDGES 10, 86, 94-98 (Sylvan A. Sobel ed., 2nd ed. 2007), http://
www.fjc.gov (discussing the role of U.S. law clerks in drafting judicial decisions and opin-
ions); Joint Report, supra, at 576; Onyema, supra, at 100 (analogizing tribunal secretaries to
judicial law clerks).
43. Some countries require reasoned awards in all sorts of arbitration, including do-
mestic proceedings, while other countries permit the parties to choose whether to obtain a
reasoned award. See BORN, supra note 2, at 3037-48. In either case, domestic arbitrators
would benefit from an increased appreciation of what constitutes a reasoned award and how
such an award may be written, since the situation regarding the continuing education of arbi-
trators is often as dire domestically as it is internationally. See supra notes 22-32 and accom-
panying text. However, domestic awards differ from international awards in a number of key
regards, so arbitrators should tailor their writing appropriately. See infra note 243-46 and
accompanying text.
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The primary focus of this Article is to analyze various process-ori-
ented and structural issues relating to reasoned awards in international
commercial arbitration so as to improve the practical and theoretical un-
derstanding of international awards. That discussion, which is found in
Section IV, considers various factors from both the common law and civil
law perspectives so as to take into account the blended nature of interna-
tional commercial arbitration.44
Of course, to be fully comprehensible, the detailed analysis in Section
IV must first be put into context. Therefore, Section II describes the diffi-
culties associated with defining a reasoned award in international commer-
cial arbitration while Section III considers why such awards are necessary
or useful as a functional matter.45
Before beginning, it is helpful to note two basic points. First, reasoned
awards can vary a great deal in terms of form, tone and style.46 As a result,
this Article does not suggest a single, formulaic model that should be fol-
lowed in all cases but instead provides an analytical framework that can be
adapted to the particular needs of the dispute at hand. Second, when dis-
cussing how international commercial arbitrators should approach the
drafting of a reasoned award, this Article does not address basic rules of
good writing. Although these issues can be quite important,47 they are
covered in detail elsewhere and need not be discussed herein.48
II. WHAT CONSTITUTES A REASONED AWARD IN INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
The first matter to consider involves the question of what constitutes a
reasoned award in international commercial arbitration. Most institutional
rules applicable to international commercial arbitration49 simply indicate
44. See BORN, supra note 2, at 2207-10; STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 1, at 6.
45. Experts in adult education have found that adult learners do best when they un-
derstand why certain information is being presented. See MALCOLM S. KNOWLES, THE MOD-
ERN PRACTICE OF ADULT EDUCATION: FROM PEDAGOGY TO ANDRAGOGY 45-49 (1980).
These principles have been successfully applied in the context of judicial education and can
be extended to arbitral education. See ARMYTAGE, supra note 34, at 106-11, 127-30.
46. See Lloyd et al., supra note 3, at 20.
47. Matters that initially appear to be questions of style can have substantive effects on
the law. For example, legal decisions have been known to turn on the precise placement of a
comma. See Standard Bent Glass Corp. v. Glassrobots Oy, 333 F.3d 440, 449 (3d Cir. 2003)
(construing the New York Convention).
48. Some good manuals concerning general principles of standard and legal writing
include THE CHICAGO MANUAL OF STYLE (16th ed. 2010); ALASTAIR FOWLER, HOW TO
WRITE (2006); BRYAN A. GARNER, THE ELEMENTS OF LEGAL STYLE (2nd ed. 2002); BRYAN
A. GARNER, LEGAL WRITING IN PLAIN ENGLISH: A TEXT WITH EXERCISES (2nd ed. 2013);
BRYAN A. GARNER, THE REDBOOK: A MANUAL ON LEGAL STYLE (2nd ed. 2006); ANTONIN
SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF PERSUADING JUDGES
(2008); STRONG, HOW TO WRITE, supra note 31; S.I. STRONG & BRAD DESNOYER, HOW TO
WRITE LAW EXAMS: IRAC PERFECTED ch. 8 (2016); WILLIAM STRUNK JR. & E.B. WHITE,
THE ELEMENTS OF STYLE (1999).
49. Most international commercial arbitrations are governed by various procedural
rules chosen by the parties, although it is possible to proceed in the absence of such provi-
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that an award should include “reasons,” at least as a default position, with-
out any further explanation as to what is entailed by that term.50
sions. See STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 1, at 7-9 (discussing institutional arbitration and ad
hoc arbitration).
50. See INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ICDR) INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION RULES, art. 30(1) (amended in 2014), https://www.icdr.org/icdr/ShowProperty;j
sessionid=WL65TGcH2K16QdzHPG1Zh9vL2tB2V1J5Mm8HvxPqf96wpGgd2Ph!102604678
?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTAGE2020868&revision=LAtestreleased (“The tribunal shall state
the reasons upon which the award is based, unless the parties have agreed that no reasons
need be given.”); INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (ICC) ARBITRATION RULES,
art. 31(2), http://www.iccwbo.org/Products-and-Services/Arbitration-and-ADR/Arbitration/
Rules-of-arbitration/ICC-Rules-of-Arbitration/ (“The award shall state the reasons upon
which it is based.”) [hereinafter ICC ARBITRATION RULES]; LONDON COURT OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ARBITRATION (LCIA) ARBITRATION RULES, art. 26.2, http://www.lcia.org/Dispute_
Resolution_Services/lcia-arbitration-rules-2014.aspx (“The Arbitral Tribunal shall make any
award in writing and, unless all parties agree in writing otherwise, shall state the reasons
upon which such award is based.”); STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (SCC) ARBITRA-
TION RULES, art. 36(1), http://www.sccinstitute.com/media/56030/2007_arbitration_rules
_eng.pdf (“The Arbitral Tribunal shall make its award in writing, and, unless otherwise
agreed by the parties, shall state the reasons upon which the award is based.”); United Na-
tions Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules, art. 34(3),
G.A. Res. 65/22, art. 34(3) (Jan. 10, 2011), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitra
tion/arb-rules-revised/arb-rules-revised-2010-e.pdf (“The arbitral tribunal shall state the rea-
sons upon which the award is based, unless the parties have agreed that no reasons are to be
given.”). However, in practice, many standard procedural orders used by arbitrators contain
phrases such as “The award shall contain the reasoning of the Arbitrator, applicable prece-
dent and findings of fact and conclusions of law.”
Although the Chinese International Economic and Trade Commission (CIETAC)
adopts an approach similar to that of other arbitral institutions, CIETAC’s language is a bit
more comprehensive and indicates that:
The arbitral tribunal shall state in the award the claims, the facts of the dispute, the
reasons on which the award is based, the result of the award, the allocation of the
arbitration costs, and the date on which and the place at which the award is made.
The facts of the dispute and the reasons on which the award is based may not be
stated in the award if the parties have so agreed, or if the award is made in accor-
dance with the terms of a settlement agreement between the parties.
CHINA INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND TRADE ARBITRATION COMMISSION (CIETAC) AR-
BITRATION RULES, art. 49(3), http://www.cietac.org/index/rules.cms. Other relevant portions
of the CIETAC rules state that
1. The arbitral tribunal shall independently and impartially render a fair and rea-
sonable arbitral award based on the facts of the case and the terms of the contract,
in accordance with the law, and with reference to international practices.
2. . . .
3. . . . The arbitral tribunal has the power to fix in the award the specific time
period for the parties to perform the award and the liabilities for failure to do so
within the specified time period.
4. . . .
5. Where a case is examined by an arbitral tribunal composed of three arbitrators,
the award shall be rendered by all three arbitrators or a majority of the arbitrators.
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To some extent, the lack of detail regarding the shape and content of a
reasoned award may be the result of the difficulties inherent in describing
a reasoned award in the abstract. Indeed, it is often easier to identify spe-
cific examples of fully reasoned decisions than to provide a categorical
definition of what constitutes adequate legal reasoning.51 Nevertheless,
various authorities have attempted to provide a more detailed explanation
of what constitutes a reasoned award.52 Thus, a reasoned ruling may be
described as one that includes “findings of fact and conclusions of law
based upon the evidence as a whole . . . [and that] clearly and concisely
states and explains the rationale for the decisions so that all can determine
why and how a particular result was reached.”53
A written dissenting opinion shall be kept with the file and may be appended to
the award. Such dissenting opinion shall not form a part of the award.
6. Where the arbitral tribunal cannot reach a majority opinion, the arbitral award
shall be rendered in accordance with the presiding arbitrator’s opinion. The writ-
ten opinions of the other arbitrators shall be kept with the file and may be ap-
pended to the award. Such written opinions shall not form a part of the award.
. . . .
Id. art. 49.
51. No such analyses have been conducted in the international realm, although some
attempts have been made in judicial and other arbitral contexts. See Marilyn Blumberg Cane
& Ilya Torchinsky, Explaining “Explained Decisions”: NASD’s Proposal for Written Explana-
tions in Arbitration Awards, 16 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 23 (2007); see also Hart v. Massanari,
266 F.3d 1155, 1176-77 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing and reflecting on the qualities of a rea-
soned ruling); THE GREEN BAG ALMANAC & READER, supra note 9 (listing well-written
judicial rulings on an annual basis). One particularly detailed study has come in the world of
investment arbitration, where commentators have claimed that annulment tribunals “have
adopted no less than three different thresholds to meet the reasons requirement.” Cheng &
Trisotto, supra note 2, at 424. However, these tribunals
appear to have achieved unanimity on one important conceptual point: the reasons
requirement is in fact a reasoning standard. Disagreements among committees
about whether the standard should be high or low are . . . fundamentally about
what methods of reasoning are acceptable. The high standard countenances only
reasoning that is correct on the law and facts and the rational derivation of out-
comes therefrom; the low standard tolerates reasoning that is incorrect due to mis-
takes in the law or facts, so long as the reasoning is internally consistent; and the
intermediate standard requires coherence and permits errors of law and fact, so
long as these errors are reasonable errors.
Id. The highest level of scrutiny identified in investment disputes appears to contradict the
standard applicable in the international commercial context. See BORN, supra note 2, at 3044
(“The requirement for a reasoned award is also not a requirement for a well-reasoned award:
bad or unpersuasive reasons are still reasons, and satisfy statutory requirements for reasoned
awards.”).
52. See BORN, supra note 2, at 3040-41, 3043-44.
53. 77 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 834 (2013). Although this definition arises in the context of the
statutory duties of a workers’ compensation board, the principles appear to apply equally in
other situations, including arbitration. See Jennifer Kirby, What Is An Award, Anyway? 31 J.
INT’L ARB. 475, 476 (2014).
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As useful as this definition may seem, it only goes so far, since finding
“the appropriate methodology for distinguishing questions of fact from
questions of law [is], to say the least, elusive.”54 Indeed, “the practical
truth [is] that the decision to label an issue a ‘question of law,’ a ‘question
of fact,’ or a ‘mixed question of law and fact’ is sometimes as much a mat-
ter of allocation as it is of analysis.”55
These kinds of practical difficulties suggest that the best way to define
a reasoned award may be through a functional analysis.56 That sort of ap-
proach is particularly useful in this setting because a functional inquiry not
only overcomes various differences that exist between common law and
civil law legal reasoning (an important feature given that international
commercial arbitration consciously blends elements from both the com-
mon law and civil law legal traditions),57 it also takes into account the
various ways that arbitral awards differ from reasoned rulings generated
by a court.
In this context, a functional analysis requires two separate steps. The
first considers why reasoned awards might be necessary or useful in inter-
national commercial arbitration. This issue is taken up in Section III. The
second looks into how the structure of reasoned awards might vary, de-
pending on the particular type of dispute at issue. Those concerns are ad-
dressed in Section IV.
III. WHY REASONED AWARDS ARE NECESSARY OR USEFUL IN
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
Some people appear to believe that reasoned rulings are an exclusive
feature of the common law legal tradition.58 However, civil law countries
have long considered reasoned legal opinions to be essential to procedural
justice, even though the shape of a civil law judicial opinion can differ
significantly from what is standard in common law jurisdictions.59 For ex-
ample, reasoned decisions in France are usually quite short and “formu-
lated in a single sentence, including several ‘whereas-es’ (attendus).”60
54. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1985) (citations omitted).
55. Id. (citation omitted).
56. See Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 339, 342, 357 (Mathias Reiman & Reinhard Zimmerman
eds., 2006).
57. See BORN, supra note 2, at 2207-10; STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 1, at 6.
58. See Michael L. Wells, “Sociological Legitimacy” in Supreme Court Opinion, 64
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1011, 1029 (2007) (suggesting that “French practice belies the notion
that well-reasoned [apparently meaning fully reasoned] opinions are in some sense
necessary”).
59. See Fontaine, supra note 3, at 33; Shoenberger, supra note 11, at 5.
60. Jeffrey L. Friesen, When Common Law Courts Interpret Civil Codes, 15 WISC.
INT’L L.J. 1, 8 (1996) (“The succinctness of French decisions is consistent with—and probably
produced by—the primacy of text, conceptualism, and deduction, as well as the post-revolu-
tionary caution on the part of judges not to exceed their limited powers.”); see also Kai
Schadbach, The Benefits of Comparative Law: A Continental European View, 16 B. U. INT’L
L.J. 331, 343 n.63 (1998) (citing Erhard Blankenburg, Patterns of Legal Culture: The Nether-
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However, other civil law jurisdictions, most notably Germany, often gen-
erate reasoned opinions that are remarkable for their “length and
thoroughness.”61
Although French courts consider very brief, highly deductive opinions
to be sufficiently reasoned as a matter of procedural fairness,62 this partic-
ular structural approach does not appear to have been routinely adopted
in international commercial arbitration.63 Instead, the concept of a rea-
soned award in international commercial arbitration appears to more
closely resemble the longer, more discursive models seen in the common
law and in civil law jurisdictions like Germany.64 Thus, most awards in
international commercial arbitration currently run dozens of pages in
length.65
When considering why reasoned awards might be useful or necessary
in international commercial arbitration, it is helpful to distinguish struc-
tural rationales for reasoned rulings from non-structural rationales. This
approach not only overcomes matters relating to the common law-civil law
lands Compared to Neighboring Germany, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 40 (1998) (“Whoever com-
pares the arguments of a decision of a German Landgericht with those of a Dutch rechtbank
will be impressed by the length and thoroughness of the German argument on the one hand,
the straightforward, paper-saving decision of the Dutch court on the other. In appeal courts
and before the highest courts the differences in elaborateness are even more apparent. Ger-
man legal style is much more differentiated, scholarly worded; the style of Dutch courts is
pragmatic . . . .”)).
61. Schadbach, supra note 60, at 343 n.63 (citing ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN &
JAMES RUSSELL GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARA-
TIVE STUDY OF LAW 1140 (2d ed. 1977)); Blankenburg, supra note 60, at 40; Louis Goutal,
Characteristics of Judicial Style in France, Britain and the U.S.A., 24 AM. J. COMP. L. 43, 45
(1976).
62. See Mathilde Cohen, When Judges Have Reasons Not to Give Reasons: A Compar-
ative Law Approach, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 483, 533 n.286 (2015).
63. See Gaitis, supra note 9, at 17 (describing what is typically included in a reasoned
award); Fontaine, supra note 3, at 36 (noting that French-style “whereas” clauses (attendus)
are generally not used in international awards, even in those countries where that style of
writing is common in the judicial context). But see Dow Chemical (Fr., U.S., Switz. v. Fr.),
International Chamber of Commerce Case No. 4131, Interim Award, IX Y.B. COM. ARB.
131, 135 (Sept. 23, 1984) (using attendu clauses, although the decision was translated from
French and comes from an earlier era in international commercial arbitration).
64. See, e.g., Contractor v. Producer (Zam. v. Zam.), International Chamber of Com-
merce Case No. 16484, Final Award, (2011), XXXIX Y.B. COMM. ARB. 216 (2014); Fontaine,
supra note 3, at 36; see also XXXIX Y.B. COMM. ARB. 30-305 (2014) (publishing a variety of
recent awards); Schadbach, supra note 60, at 343 n.63 (comparing German and Dutch legal
decisions).
65. See, e.g., Contractor (Zam.), XXXIX Y.B. COMM. ARB. at 216; Fontaine, supra
note 3, at 36; Catherine A. Rogers, Transparency in International Commercial Arbitration, 54
U. KAN. L. REV. 1301, 1316-17 n.64 (2006) [hereinafter Rogers, Transparency]; see also XX-
XIX Y.B. COMM. ARB. at 30-305 (publishing a variety of recent awards); QMUL, supra note
13 (offering a course in award writing and indicating that the mock award produced by stu-
dents must exceed 5,000 words). A somewhat shorter example can be found at CONSORTIUM
MEMBER V. CONSORTIUM LEADER (It. v. Neth.), International Chamber of Commerce Case
No. 14630, Final Award, XXXVII Y.B. COMM. ARB. 90 (2012). Notably, some commentators
have suggested that “in some instances, longer is not better.” BORN, supra note 2, at 3041-42.
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divide, it also helps identify rationales that are exclusively associated with
judicial rulings and that are therefore inapplicable in the arbitral context.66
A. Structural Rationales for Reasoned Awards
Perhaps the most well-known structural rationale supporting the use
of reasoned rulings comes from the common law legal tradition, which
requires “subsequent courts to adhere to the legal conclusions established
in earlier judgments rendered by courts whose decisions are binding upon
the ruling court.”67 Reasoned decisions are used in common law jurisdic-
tions to provide “the necessary reasoning (the ‘ratio decidendi’) for courts
bound to adhere to precedent under stare decisis.”68 Because the principle
of stare decisis does not technically apply in international commercial arbi-
tration, this rationale does not appear applicable to the arbitral forum,
strictly speaking.69
However, arbitral awards are considered very important forms of per-
suasive authority and have been said to reflect a type of “soft precedent”
in certain types of international disputes (most notably those involving in-
vestment and sports arbitration) and in certain types of matters (most no-
tably those involving arbitral procedure).70 The willingness of
international arbitrators to consider and in many cases follow the reason-
ing reflected in previous awards can be traced directly to the need for
66. See W. Laurence Craig, The Arbitrator’s Mission and the Application of Law in
International Commercial Arbitration, 21 AM. REV. INT’L L. 243, 284 (2010) (noting five rea-
sons why Lord Bingham of Cornhill, former Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales,
thought reasoned judgments were necessary in court and applying those rationales to arbitra-
tion); Jones, supra note 19, at 282-83 (suggesting arbitrators can learn from judges); Strong,
Writing, supra note 6, at 101-06.
67. Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 766 (2011) (citation
omitted). Interestingly, it was not until the late nineteenth century that common law courts
began to impose upon themselves a strict duty to follow previous case law. See KONRAD
ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 260 (Tony Weir trans.,
3d ed. 1998).
68. FitzMaurice & O’Connor, supra note 3. Stare decisis has been said to “reflect[ ] a
policy judgment that in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be
settled than that it be settled right.” Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin, 131 S. Ct. at 766
(suggesting that reliance on precedent is preferable to other mechanisms “because it pro-
motes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles”).
69. See STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 1, at 21; STRONG, RESEARCH, supra note 8, at 26-
27.
70. Although the concept of “soft precedent” is most widely supported in investment
arbitration and sports arbitration, where publication of denatured awards is relatively rou-
tine, some commentators believe that arbitral awards have some precedential value even in
the international commercial setting. See STRONG, RESEARCH, supra note 8, at 26-27 (noting
the precedential power of previous international awards is highest in matters of arbitral pro-
cedure); Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse?, 23
ARB. INT’L 357, 361-78 (2007) (discussing investment and sports arbitration); Rogers, Voca-
tion, supra note 21, at 1004 (“In a meaningful sense, international arbitration produces prece-
dents that are public goods.”). Arbitral awards also contribute to the development of
substantive legal principles via the lex mercatoria. See Fontaine, supra note 3, at 32.
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predictability and consistency in international commercial arbitration.71
Interestingly, the approach used in international commercial arbitration is
similar to that found in many civil law countries, where judges routinely
follow the decisions of higher level courts, even if the principle of prece-
dent does not apply, so as to promote predictability and consistency.72
Thus, reasoned awards may be said to be useful for this first type of struc-
tural purpose, even if they are not strictly necessary.
Reasoned rulings serve other structural purposes. For example, rea-
soned decisions are used in both common law and civil law jurisdictions to
give context to lower court decisions and thereby help appellate courts
determine whether and to what extent to uphold the judgment below.73
Initially, this rationale might also appear inapplicable to international
commercial arbitration, since most jurisdictions do not allow courts to re-
view the merits of an arbitral award.74 However, some jurisdictions, most
notably England, do allow judicial appeals of international awards, which
could be seen as providing arbitrators with a strong incentive to render
well-written reasoned awards in arbitrations seated in England.75
International awards may also be subject to other types of post-award
scrutiny, both inside and outside of England.76 One type of post-award
judicial procedure involves a challenge to enforcement, either at the seat
of arbitration or in a foreign jurisdiction. Although these types of actions
usually focus on procedural matters,77 the likelihood of a challenge being
brought in the first place may be affected by the quality of the reasoning
71. See STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 1, at 21 (quoting Interim Award in International
Chamber of Commerce Case No. 4131, IX Y.B. COM. ARB. 131, 135 (1984), which stated that
“[t]he decisions of these [arbitral] tribunals progressively create case law which should be
taken into account, because it draws conclusions from economic reality and conforms to the
needs of international commerce, to which rules specific to international arbitration, them-
selves successively elaborated should respond.”).
72. See PETER DE CRUZ, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 70 (3d ed.
2007); STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 1, at 17.
73. See J.J. GEORGE, JUDICIAL OPINION WRITING HANDBOOK 26 (5th ed. 2007). Pro-
viding all of the relevant factual data and outlining each step of the legal analysis allows an
appellate court to consider the propriety of the decision-making process below in a compre-
hensive and principled manner. See id.
74. See BORN, supra note 2, at 83.
75. The right to appeal an arbitral award is found in section 69 of the Arbitration Act
1996, although parties may opt out of this provision. See Arbitration Act, (1996) § 69, (Eng.);
Rowan Platt, The Appeal of Appeal Mechanisms in International Arbitration: Fairness over
Finality?, 30 J. INT’L ARB. 531, 534-43 (2013). Notably, England is one of the top jurisdictions
in the world for international commercial arbitration. See Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Friendli-
ness: Promises of Principle and Realities of Practice, 23 ARB. INT’L 477, 477 (2007).
76. Although parties in international commercial arbitration usually comply with
awards on a voluntary basis, the number and type of post-award challenges may be increas-
ing. See BORN, supra note 2, at 3410 (claiming “[i]n practice, the overwhelming majority of
international awards are complied with voluntarily”); Strong, Border Skirmishes, supra note
4, at 8 (discussing rising number of challenges).
77. Public policy objections, which could be seen as a substantive in nature, are a pos-
sible ground for non-enforcement at the seat of arbitration and elsewhere. See, e.g., Conven-
tion on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. V, June 10, 1958,
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found in the underlying award.78 For example, a well-written and fully rea-
soned award may persuade the losing party that a decision is well-sup-
ported, even if the outcome is negative.79 Alternatively, a fully reasoned
award may diminish the likelihood of a judicial challenge by eliminating
certain grounds for non-enforcement, as might be the case in situations
where an international arbitral tribunal explicitly takes European competi-
tion or U.S. antitrust law into account, thereby dissuading the losing party
from challenging an award in European or U.S. courts on certain public
policy grounds.80
Another type of post-award procedure involves collateral proceed-
ings.81 These types of actions may be on the rise, given the increasing inci-
dence of parallel proceedings in international commercial disputes.82
Although the law concerning preclusion and collateral estoppel are not as
well developed in arbitration as in litigation,83 a court may find itself una-
ble to give preclusive effect to a ruling or award that is unreasoned, since
the court cannot determine whether a particular issue was fully and fairly
argued in the earlier action.84
The final type of post-award procedure involves “arbitral appeals,”
which are an entirely private, contractually created means of appealing the
substance of an arbitral award.85 Over the last few years, several arbitral
330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention]; 9 U.S.C. §§ 10, 208 (2015); Arbitration
Act 1996 §§ 68, 103.
78. See BORN, supra note 2, at 83. At one time, arbitrators were advised not to be too
discursive in their awards lest they create grounds for vacatur or non-enforcement. See Fon-
taine, supra note 3, at 33. However, arbitrators are now advised to “protect the award”
through judicious drafting, which may include a more detailed description of the reasons for
the award. See AAA, WRITING ARBITRATION AWARDS: A GUIDE FOR ARBITRATORS (April
23, 2014), https://www.aaau.org/media/20549/writing%20arbitration%20awards%20-
%20materials.pdf; Edna Sussman, Arbitrator Decision-Making: Unconscious Psychological
Influences and What You Can Do About Them, XI REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE ARBITRAGEM
76, 83 (2014) (Braz.).
79. See Fontaine, supra note 3, at 34; Marx, supra note 5, at 23 (quoting a party who
stated, “We weren’t at all happy with your award, but I can’t complain because you explained
it so well”).
80. See BORN, supra note 2, at 3688-70 (discussing the “second look” doctrine); see
also Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v. Benetton Int’l NV, [1999] E.C.R. I-3055; Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638 (1985).
81. See BORN, supra note 2, at 3732.
82. See NADJA ERK-KABAT, PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRA-
TION: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 1 (2014); STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 1, 85-87.
83. See BORN, supra note 2, at 3733; STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 1, 85-87.
84. See BORN, supra note 2, at 3757.
85. See Judge Rudolph Kass, A Private Path to Appellate Arbitration, 50 BOSTON B.J.
35, 35 (Jan./Feb. 2006); Paul Bennett Marrow, A Practical Approach to Affording Review of
Commercial Arbitration Awards Using an Appellate Arbitrator in, 60 DISP. RESOL. J. 10, 13-
15 (Aug.-Oct. 2005). Because this process does not require any form of judicial review, it
does not run afoul of the U.S. Supreme Court’s prohibition on contractual expansions of
judicial jurisdiction. See Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 550 U.S. 968 (2007); Richard C.
Reuben, Personal Autonomy and Vacatur After Hall Street, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1103, 1150-
51 (2009). Arbitral appeals are somewhat different than the kind of annulment proceedings
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organizations have established formal procedures for appellate arbitra-
tion.86 The evolution of this particular procedure has important ramifica-
tions for the award writing process, both at first instance and on appeal.87
For example, arbitrators hearing a dispute as an initial matter may need to
be increasingly aware of the quality of their awards both to avoid creating
an appealable issue88 and to provide an appellate tribunal with a solid
understanding of how and why the initial decision was made.89 Questions
will also arise as to whether and to what extent an appellate award can or
should differ from an award at first instance as a matter of form or
content.90
B. Non-Structural Rationales for Reasoned Awards
As the preceding discussion suggests, there are a number of structural
rationales supporting the use of reasoned awards in international commer-
cial arbitration. These structural reasons apply despite the various func-
tional differences between litigation and arbitration. However, there are
also several non-structural reasons why reasoned awards are useful or nec-
essary in international commercial arbitration.
used in certain investment arbitrations. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes Between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention), Rules of Proce-
dure for Arbitration, Rules 50-55, Mar. 18, 1965, [1966], T.I.A.S. No. 6090. Arbitral appeals
also differ from the types of appellate procedures contemplated by the Court of Arbitration
for Sport (CAS). See Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), Procedural Rules 47-59, http://
www.tas-cas.org/en/arbitration/code-procedural-rules.html [hereinafter CAS Arbitration
Rules] (discussing arbitral appeals from rulings generated by a federation or national sports
body); Louise Reilly, An Introduction to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) & The Role
of National Courts in International Sports Disputes, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 63, 64-65.
86. See e.g., Optional Appellate Arbitration Rules, AAA, (Nov. 1, 2013), http://
go.adr.org/AppellateRules [hereinafter AAA Appellate Rules]; International Institute for
Conflict Prevention and Resolution (CPR) Arbitration Appeal Procedure and Commentary,
https://www.cpradr.org/Portals/0/Resources/ADR%20Tools/Clauses%20&%20Rules/CPR
%20Arbitration%20Appeal%20Procedure.pdf [hereinafter CPR Appellate Rules]; Optional
Arbitration Appeal Procedure, JAMS (2003), http://www.jamsadr.com/appeal/ [hereinafter
JAMS Appellate Rules]. Such procedures are not limited to the United States. See Arbitra-
tion Appeals Tribunal, ARBITRATORS’ AND MEDIATORS’ INSTITUTE OF NEW ZEALAND
(AMINZ) (2012), http://www.aminz.org.nz/Category?Action=View&Category_id=172. Fur-
thermore, parties to do not have to adopt an appellate rule set but can instead simply estab-
lish arbitral appeal by contract. See STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 1, at 7-9; Marrow, supra note
85, at 13.
87. Some authorities have suggested that, in cases involving two tiers of arbitration,
the first decision does not constitute an “award” per se. See BORN, supra note 2, at 2926
(citing a French decision). However, the initial decision will be referred to as an “award” for
purposes of the current discussion.
88. The notion of what constitutes an appealable issue is by no means entirely clear.
See Marrow, supra note 85, at 14-15. At this point, parties must rely largely on the language
reflected in the relevant rules. See infra notes 165-70 and accompanying text (discussing the
standard and scope of appellate review).
89. See Kass, supra note 85, at 35.
90. See infra notes 156-70 and accompanying text (regarding drafting of appellate
awards).
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First and perhaps most importantly, reasoned awards provide key as-
surances regarding the nature and quality of justice that is being dispensed
by the arbitrator. Commentators have noted that both common law and
civil law jurisdictions have recognized a “procedural trinity” that is neces-
sary to establish the rule of law.91 The three constituent elements include:
1. the audiatur principle (audiatur et altera pars), which in En-
gland and America forms part of natural justice and due pro-
cess of law;
2. explicit reasons and fact finding; [and]
3. the right to appeal.92
While parties in arbitration are allowed to waive the right to an appeal
as well as the right to explicit reasons and fact finding, such waivers are
not a required feature of arbitration.93 To the contrary, as the recent de-
bate about arbitral appeals has shown, parties can enforce these procedu-
ral rights to the extent consistent with the arbitral setting.94 Thus, while it
remains to be seen how the reasons requirement in international commer-
cial arbitration compares to similar standards applicable in litigation, it is
clear that arbitrators must provide some minimal level of reasoning once
the parties have requested a reasoned award.95 In fact, the length and de-
tail associated with reasoned awards in international commercial arbitra-
tion suggests that international arbitrators are far exceeding any minimum
requirements.96
Second, use of reasoned awards improves the quality of the decision-
making process and consequently of the decision itself.97 As U.S. Circuit
91. Gunnar Bergholtz, Ratio et Auctoritas: A Comparative Study of the Significance of
Reasoned Decisions with Special Reference to Civil Cases, 33 SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES IN LAW
11, 44 (1989); see also Rogers, Vocation, supra note 21, at 985 n.97 (claiming “the product of
international arbitral decision-making is justice”).
92. Bergholtz, supra note 91, at 44.
93. There has never been any claim that parties in arbitration can waive the audiatur
principle. See S.I. Strong, Limits of Procedural Choice of Law, 39 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1027,
1100-01 (2014) [hereinafter Strong, Procedural Limits]. Furthermore, some jurisdictions do
not allow parties to waive the reasoning requirement. See Duarte Gorjão Henriques, Motiva-
tion of Arbitral Awards: A Few Notes, 10 YOUNG ARB. REV. 34, 34-35 (2013) (noting that
arbitration awards must be reasoned under Portuguese law).
94. Thus, for example, parties may require arbitral appeals but not judicial appeals.
See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
95. See Lloyd et al., supra note 3, at 27; see also infra note 246 and accompanying text.
For example, some commentators have suggested that arbitral awards do not necessarily
need to have the same degree and depth of legal reasoning as judicial decisions and opinions.
See, e.g., BORN, supra note 2, at 3044.
96. See supra note 65 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 165-302 and accom-
panying text. Critics of arbitration often claim that arbitration results in “second-class jus-
tice.” See Hiro N. Aragaki, Arbitration’s Suspect Status, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1233, 1263 (2011)
(tracing history of hostility to arbitration, primarily in the domestic U.S. context).
97. See GEORGE, supra note 73, at 27; see also Fontaine, supra note 3, at 34; Chad M.
Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial Function, 96 GEO. L.J. 1283,
1302 (2008).
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Judge Richard Posner has noted, “[r]easoning that seemed sound when ‘in
the head’ may seem half-baked when written down, especially since the
written form of an argument encourages some degree of critical detach-
ment in the writer, who in reading what he [or she] has written will be
wondering how an audience would react.”98 By encouraging arbitrators to
articulate their reasons for following a particular course of action, rea-
soned awards help increase the rationality of the process, minimize the
likelihood of arbitrary decisions, prevent the introduction of irrelevant is-
sues into the analysis, decrease the possibility of reliance on unreliable
evidence and promote justice while simultaneously showing society that
these aims are being met.99
Third, reasoned awards can be said to enhance the legitimacy of the
arbitral process in the eyes of the arbitrators, the parties and the public by
demonstrating the seriousness and integrity of the arbitral endeavor.100
Reputational concerns may be particularly important as international arbi-
tration comes under increased attack for matters ranging from the lack of
transparency to the supposedly preferential treatment of large, multina-
tional firms.101
Fourth, reasoned awards provide parties with a more detailed and sat-
isfactory explanation of why the arbitrator decided as he or she did.102
This feature can be quite important, since parties – including parties to
commercial disputes – are often motivated as much by emotion as by
logic, and a party who believes that he or she has not been fully “heard”
during the arbitration (a phenomenon that could be directly affected by
the quality or content of the award) might mount a challenge, even if the
chance of prevailing seems relatively low.103 Indeed, empirical studies
have shown that “the perceived fairness of arbitration hearings signifi-
cantly predicts litigant decisions to accept an arbitration decision,” which
suggests that fully reasoned awards are beneficial to international com-
mercial arbitration at both an individual and systemic level.104
98. Richard A. Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1421, 1447-48 (1995).
99. FitzMaurice & O’Connor, supra note 3, at n.19.
100. See id.; Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in Private Judging, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 485, 532
(1997) (quoting Thomas Carbonneau for the proposition that “reasoned awards ‘could serve
as a means of assessing the arbitrators’ ability to assure the parties of a principled decisional
basis’ ” (citation omitted)); see also GEORGE, supra note 73, at 26.
101. See Born, supra note 10, at 821 n.202; Rogers, Transparency, supra note 65, at
1325.
102. See Craig, supra note 66, at 284 (noting the importance of satisfying the parties’
curiosity as to why the case has been decided as it has); Yackee, supra note 2, at 629.
103. See Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Plaintiphobia in State Courts? An Em-
pirical Study of State Court Trials on Appeal, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 121, 126 (2009); Don Peters,
It Takes Two to Tango, and to Mediate: Legal Cultural and Other Factors Influencing United
States and Latin American Lawyers’ Resistance to Mediating Commercial Disputes, 9 RICH. J.
GLOBAL L. & BUS. 381, 398 n.124 (2010).
104. See Robert J. MacCoun, Voice, Control, and Belonging: The Double-Edged Sword
of Procedural Fairness, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 171, 177 (2005). The quality of interna-
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IV. WRITING REASONED AWARDS IN
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
The preceding section discussed various reasons why reasoned awards
are either necessary or useful in international commercial arbitration.
However, the frequency with which parties require reasoned awards sug-
gests that few people need to be convinced of the benefits of reasoned
awards in cross-border business proceedings.105 Instead, the primary con-
cern is with the execution of such awards.106
Experts agree that writing a reasoned award is an extremely challeng-
ing endeavor requiring both time and diligence.107 However, the task can
be greatly facilitated if the arbitrator has a solid grasp of the fundamental
principles underlying reasoned awards. The following discussion therefore
considers a number of process- and structure-oriented issues relating to
reasoned awards in international commercial arbitration so as to improve
the understanding of these types of awards and to assist new and exper-
ienced arbitrators who are called upon to draft such documents.
A. Issues Relating to the Process
Although some people may view the mechanics of writing an award to
be a purely logistical issue, process-related concerns can affect not only the
method used to write an award but also its content and structure. The
following subsections therefore consider those features that appear to
have the most significant effect on the reasoning and form of an arbitral
award. The list includes matters involving multi-person tribunals, dissent-
ing and concurring opinions, ruling in the alternative or on ancillary
points, conducting independent legal or factual research, and appellate
awards.
1. Multi-person tribunals
Not surprisingly, the process of writing an award differs depending on
how many arbitrators are involved.108 As a rule, sole arbitrators have
more flexibility in drafting a reasoned award than members of an arbitral
tribunal, since sole arbitrators have only their own consciences to con-
tional awards may be one reason why parties traditionally complied with the final decision of
the arbitrators. See BORN, supra note 2, at 3410 (noting most awards are complied with vol-
untarily). C.f. Strong, Border Skirmishes, supra note 4, at 2-3, 5-6 (noting increase in judicial
procedures regarding arbitration).
105. See STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 1, at 22.
106. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
107. See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1176-77 (9th Cir. 2001); DOMNARSKI, supra
note 9, at 36; Henry G. Stewart, Trials of a Neophyte Neutral: The Transition From Full-Time
Advocate, 58 DISP. RESOL. J. 39, 41 (Nov. 2003-Jan. 2004) (“[D]eciding cases and writing
opinions take much longer than I ever anticipated.”); Van Detta 1, supra note 18, at 55.
108. See Lloyd et al., supra note 3, at 25-26.
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sider.109 In cases involving multiple arbitrators, the drafting process often
includes a certain amount of compromise and negotiation.110
Every tribunal approaches the process of writing judgments differ-
ently.111 Usually the chair takes responsibility for putting together the ini-
tial draft, although that approach can be changed in any way that suits the
arbitrators, such as by giving different panel members different sections to
write.112 Regardless of who has the responsibility for writing a particular
section of an award, that person “does not have the luxury of writing inde-
pendently, but should approach the . . . task so that it will reflect the col-
lective mind of the collegial body that makes up the panel.”113
Once the first draft is written and circulated, the panel considers the
precise language of the proposed award.114 Ideally, arbitrators who disa-
gree with particular elements should not only identify the substantive
grounds of concern but should also offer alternative language for the
drafter to consider.115 This process is critically important because the
award must reflect the views of a majority of the tribunal.116 If the arbitra-
tors can reach only a narrow consensus, then the resulting award will have
to be equally narrow.117
As the process of deliberation and drafting continues, it may become
apparent that consensus cannot be reached on certain points.118 In those
cases, the majority may be able to overcome the need for a separate opin-
ion by taking the dissenting arbitrator’s views into account in the award
itself or by going forward with an award that is signed by only two mem-
bers of the tribunal.119 However, in some cases, a dissenting panelist may
insist on submitting an individual opinion.120 In those situations, the tribu-
109. See Ruggero J. Aldisert et al., Opinion Writing and Opinion Readers, 31 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1, 12-14 (2009).
110. See id. (discussing how the deliberation process affects how an opinion is written);
Tom Cobb & Sarah Kaltsounis, Real Collaborative Context: Opinion Writing and the Appel-
late Process, 5 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 156, 158-63 (2008); Lloyd et al., supra
note 3, at 25-26.
111. See DOMNARSKI, supra note 9, at 32-34; Daniel J. Bussell, Opinions First – Argu-
ment Afterward, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1194, 1196-97 (2014); Goodwin Liu, How the California
Supreme Court Really Works: A Reply to Professor Bussell, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1246, 1250-58
(2014); Lloyd et al., supra note 3, at 25-26.
112. See Lloyd, supra note 3, at 38-39; Lloyd et al., supra note 3, at 25-26.
113. GEORGE, supra note 73, at 279.
114. See Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 12-14; Lloyd et al., supra note 3, at 25-26.
115. See GEORGE, supra note 73, at 281; see also Lloyd et al., supra note 3, at 26. Criti-
cism should also be limited to matters of substance rather than style. See GEORGE, supra note
73, at 282.
116. See Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 14; Lloyd et al., supra note 3, at 26.
117. See Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 14; Lloyd et al., supra note 3, at 26.
118. See Lloyd et al., supra note 3, at 26.
119. See Manuel Arroyo, Dealing with Dissenting Opinions in the Award: Some Options
for the Tribunal, 25 ASA BULL. 437, 459-64 (2008); Lloyd et al., supra note 3, at 26.
120. See Arroyo, supra note 119, at 459-64.
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nal will need to refer to the arbitral rules governing the dispute to deter-
mine the availability and treatment of separate opinions.121
2. Dissenting and concurring opinions
The debate about individual opinions in international commercial ar-
bitration has become increasingly heated in recent years.122 Although
most rule sets permit (or at least do not explicitly disallow) dissents and
concurrences in situations where an arbitrator feels he or she cannot join
the majority opinion as a matter of conscience, the strong cultural prefer-
ence in international commercial arbitration is for a single majority award,
since a separate opinion is both expensive to draft and largely unneces-
sary, given that most awards in international commercial arbitration are
not published.123
Much of the push for dissenting opinions seems to have come from the
investment realm, where there is more of an incentive for arbitrators to
write separate opinions.124 For example, a large percentage of investment
awards are published in whole or in part, and an arbitrator may wish to
write separately so as to help develop the type of “soft precedent” that is
said to exist in treaty-based arbitration.125 Alternatively, an arbitrator may
want to set the record straight as to his or her views on a particular matter
so as to increase the likelihood of winning future appointments.126
Although most of the commentary in international arbitration focuses
on dissenting opinions, it is also possible for an arbitrator to write a con-
curring opinion.127 Concurrences are seen even less frequently than dis-
121. See C. Mark Baker & Lucy Greenwood, Dissent – But Only If You Really Feel You
Must: Why Dissenting Opinions in International Commercial Arbitration Should Only Appear
in Exceptional Circumstances, 7 DISP. RESOL. INT’L 31, 34 (May 2013). For example, the
CIETAC Arbitration Rules indicate that dissenting opinions may be written but will not form
part of the award. See CIETAC Arbitration Rules, supra note 50, art. 49. The CAS Arbitra-
tion Rules adopt a similar approach. See CAS Arbitration Rules, supra note 85, art. 46.
122. See Arroyo, supra note 119, at 437; Baker & Greenwood, supra note 121, at 31-40;
Ilhyung Lee, Introducing International Commercial Arbitration and Its Lawlessness, by Way
of the Dissenting Opinion, 4 CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 19 (2011); Alan Redfern, Dissenting
Opinions in International Commercial Arbitration: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, in ARBI-
TRATION INSIGHTS: TWENTY YEARS OF THE ANNUAL LECTURE OF THE SCHOOL OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ARBITRATION 367, 373-76 (Loukas Mistelis & Julian D.M. Lew eds., 2007); Jacques
Werner, Dissenting Opinions: Beyond Fears, 9 J. INT’L ARB. 23, 24-25 (1992); see also Pedro
J. Martinez-Fraga & Harout Jack Samra, A Defense of Dissents in Investment Arbitration, 43
U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 445, 450-63 (2012).
123. See Arroyo, supra note 119, at 458; Baker & Greenwood, supra note 121, at 34;
Redfern, supra note 122, at 379-92 (suggesting the current approach is too lenient toward
allowing dissents); van den Berg, supra note 8, at 821 n.4; see also GEORGE, supra note 73, at
282, 326-30.
124. See Baker & Greenwood, supra note 121, at 39-40.
125. See Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 70, at 361-78.
126. See Martinez-Fraga & Samra, supra note 122, at 470; van den Berg, supra note 8, at
821, 830-31.
127. Concurrences arise when the decision-maker agrees with the outcome reached by
the majority but arrives at that result through different analytical means. See van den Berg,
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sents in the international commercial context, since there is little need for
such awards in a private, non-precedential system of justice. However, ar-
bitrators in investment proceedings occasionally write concurring opinions
for reasons similar to those applicable to dissenting opinions.128
Some people oppose the use of individual opinions in international
commercial arbitration because such opinions are said to threaten the le-
gitimacy of arbitration by demonstrating a lack of unanimity among the
members of the arbitral panel.129 However, other people believe that a
well-written dissent or concurrence can be a positive feature, since such
opinions can be seen as advancing the legal debate, so long as the individ-
ual opinion is written in a respectful manner.130 Thus, sarcasm and ad
hominem attacks should play no role in a dissent, just as they should not in
a majority award.131
3. Ruling in the alternative or on ancillary points
Another issue that occasionally arises involves the question of
whether an arbitrator can or should rule in the alternative or on ancillary
points.132 On the one hand, providing alternative grounds for a decision
can be confusing and hence inefficient to the extent that parties who read
the award are not able to discern the precise basis on which the holding is
founded.133 On the other hand, reasoning in the alternative can increase
efficiency by allowing an appellate tribunal or enforcing court to uphold
the decision on the alternative rationale, thereby avoiding the possibility
of non-enforcement.134 Providing multiple reasons why a particular party
prevails can also provide additional persuasive power in cases where a sin-
supra note 8, at 837; see also SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, WRITING MANUAL: A GUIDE TO
CITATIONS, STYLE AND JUDICIAL OPINION WRITING 153-54 (2013) (noting various types of
concurrences).
128. See Alemanni v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/8, Concurring
Opinion of Mr. J. Christopher Thomas, Q.C. (Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.italaw.com/sites/
default/files/case-documents/italaw4064.pdf; van den Berg, supra note 8, at 833.
129. See generally GEORGE, supra note 73, at 329; van den Berg, supra note 8, at 833.
130. See GEORGE, supra note 73, at 281; van den Berg, supra note 8, at 823, 825.
131. See GEORGE, supra note 73, at 281; van den Berg, supra note 8, at 832. Observers
have suggested that the increasing use of sarcasm in the judicial context has been detrimental
to the public’s faith in the courts. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Scalia Tops Law Prof’s Sarcasm
Index, ABA L.J. (Jan. 20, 2015).
132. “An alternative ground used to support a decision is not dictum.” GEORGE, supra
note 73, at 331.
133. Avoidance of confusion is another reason why judges and arbitrators do not always
outline the entire basis for their decision. See Konrad Schiermann, A Response to the Judge
As Comparatist, 80 TULANE L. REV. 281, 287-90 (2005).
134. Although this rationale is more important in the judicial context, where substan-
tive appeals are common, arbitration also involves various types of post-award review. See
supra notes 67-90 and accompanying text.
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gle rationale might appear insufficient or overly legalistic to the losing
party.135
Arbitrators might also wonder whether and to what extent awards can
or should discuss matters that technically do not need to be decided in
order to reach a final conclusion.136 Normally, such rulings (referred to as
dicta in common law countries) are unnecessary and unwise in arbitration,
since the arbitrator’s jurisdiction only extends to the parties themselves
and the normal rationales justifying the use of dicta do not apply in arbi-
tration.137 However, some experts have suggested that “there may be oc-
casions when an arbitral tribunal will acknowledge that the parties
themselves . . . expect to know the views of the arbitral tribunal on a point
of law or of fact which, strictly, does not have to be decided.”138 In those
cases, an advisory ruling might be appropriate, so long as that discussion
“cannot be used to undermine the central reasoning” of the award.139
4. Independent legal or factual research
Another process-oriented question that is often raised involves the ex-
tent to which arbitrators may conduct independent research into legal or
factual issues.140 The issue of independent legal research has been ad-
dressed extensively in the judicial context, where various authorities have
suggested that
[a] competent judge is not so naive to believe that briefs will al-
ways summarize the relevant facts and the applicable law in an
accurate fashion. A competent judge uses the briefs as a starting
line and not the finish line for his or her own independent re-
search. Not only does a good judge confirm that the authorities
cited actually support the legal propositions in the briefs, a good
judge also makes sure that the authorities continue to represent a
correct statement of the law. A member of the bench who fails to
135. For example, an arbitrator might find it helpful to indicate that a party who has lost
because the claim is inadmissible for some reason (such as the running of the relevant statute
of limitations) would also have lost on the merits. See Lloyd et al., supra note 3, at 33.
136. See id. at 28.
137. The primary use of dicta is to suggest how a court would rule in the future on
certain facts not presently at issue. See Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining
Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 958 (2005). Courts use dicta to guide the future behavior of the
parties and those who are similarly situated, thereby reducing the amount of future litigation
and increasing judicial efficiency. See id. at 1000. Although dicta may be useful to the parties
in cases where they are in a longstanding relationship that might give rise to future disputes
that are somewhat similar to the one in arbitration, none of the other rationales are relevant
in the arbitral context.
138. Lloyd et al., supra note 3, at 28.
139. Id.
140. See Phillip Landolt, Arbitrators’ Initiatives to Obtain Factual and Legal Evidence,
28 ARB. INT’L 173, 173 (2012).
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independently develop his or her own legal rationale does so at
his or her own peril and the peril of the litigants.141
Some commentators have gone so far as to say that “[w]hile the briefs
prepared by the parties will be useful, there is no substitute for indepen-
dent research.”142 However, other observers have criticized independent
judicial research because it denies the parties “the opportunity for cross-
examination, rebuttal, or the introduction of further testimony.”143 Never-
theless, experts agree that “the prerogative of the judge to search the case
law independently and to consult legal treatises is soundly entrenched,
presumably to promote uniformity and accuracy in legal
interpretation.”144
The debate about independent legal research also exists in the arbitral
realm, although it is colored by the fact that arbitrators do not have the
same duty that judges do to ensure the proper development of the law.145
The contractual nature of arbitration has also led various commentators to
argue that parties have a heightened right to develop their own cases and
that concerns about “the opportunity for cross-examination, rebuttal, or
the introduction of further testimony” should lead arbitrators to avoid un-
dertaking any form of independent legal research.146
After weighing these competing interests, most authorities have con-
cluded that arbitrators have the right to conduct independent research but
that they should exercise that right in a limited fashion.147 In particular,
arbitrators should ask for supplemental briefing on any question of law
that was not initially raised by the parties in their submissions.148 This ap-
proach is justified on the grounds that it increases the likelihood that the
arbitrator will arrive at the correct conclusion of law while simultaneously
141. Camacho v. Trimble Irrevocable Trust, 756 N.W.2d 596, 298-99 (Wisc. Ct. App.
2008); see also Hampton v. Wyant, 296 F.3d 560, 564-65 (7th Cir. 2002).
142. GEORGE, supra note 73, at 199.
143. In re J., 365 A.2d 521, 522 (1976); see Edward K. Cheng, Independent Judicial Re-
search in the Daubert Age, 56 DUKE L.J. 1263, 1296 (2007) (noting that “[a] few judges and
commentators have advocated against” independent legal research).
144. Id.
145. See GEORGE, supra note 73, at 275; Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 14; Audley
Sheppard, Mandatory Rules in International Commercial Arbitration – An English Perspec-
tive, 18 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 121, 144 (2007) (discussing the concept of jura novit curia (iura
novit curia) in international commercial arbitration).
146. Cheng, supra note 143, at 1296; Marrow, supra note 85, at 24-30. But see Gaitis,
supra note 9, at 17 (suggesting that “[t]he reasoning section of reasoned awards . . . , on
occasion, contains citations to legal authorities that were not presented to the tribunal by the
parties.”).
147. See International Law Association, International Commercial Arbitration Com-
mittee, Final Report: Ascertaining the Contents of the Applicable Law in International Com-
mercial Arbitration 23 (2008) [hereinafter ILA Report]; Gaitis, supra note 9, at 17; Landolt,
supra note 140, at 175, 191; Marrow, supra note 85, at 30; Sheppard, supra note 145, at 144-
45.
148. See ILA Report, supra note 147; Marrow, supra note 85, at 30; Sheppard, supra
note 145, at 144-45.
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avoiding surprise and allowing the parties to take the lead in developing
their cases.149 However, concerns about surprise and autonomy are not
implicated with respect to legal materials that have been cited by the par-
ties in their submissions. Therefore, an arbitrator may and perhaps should
“confirm that the authorities cited actually support the legal propositions
in the briefs” and ensure that the authorities “continue to represent a cor-
rect statement of the law.”150
The situation involving independent factual research is somewhat dif-
ferent.151 For example, analogies to judicial processes are largely un-
helpful, since “the rules governing independent [factual] research are
astonishingly unclear” and the bench is sharply divided as to what the best
course of action is.152 To the extent that any sort of consensus exists, it
appears to suggest that judges should conduct independent factual re-
search very rarely and only in the interests of justice.153
Although the issue has seldom been discussed in the arbitral realm,
those authorities that have considered the matter have indicated that inde-
pendent factual research should be treated in the same way as indepen-
dent legal research.154 Thus, an arbitrator who has discovered a factual
issue of relevance should ask the parties to provide further evidentiary
submissions on that matter so as to avoid the possibility of a subsequent
challenge.155
5. Appellate awards
Although arbitral appeals are not at this point a frequent occurrence,
the amount of commentary and institutional activity currently being dedi-
cated to this issue suggests that such procedures may become relatively
149. See A v. B, Tribunal Fédéral, Ière Cour de Droit Civil, 4A_554/2014 (Apr. 15,
2015), 33 ASA BULL. 406, 406–15 (2015) (discussing situation where a plaintiff applied to the
Supreme Court to annul an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitral tribunal vio-
lated due process by relying on an unpredictable application of the law and concluding that
tribunals may apply the law pursuant to the principle of iura novit curia, so long as the parties
are not taken by surprise).  Concerns exist that an arbitrator who has exceeded his or her
power to conduct independent research could create a situation where the award would be
unenforceable. See Landolt, supra note 140, at 191, 199-214.
150. Camacho v. Trimble Irrevocable Trust, 756 N.W.2d 596, 598-99 (Wisc. Ct. App.
2008); see also Hampton v. Wyant, 296 F.3d 560, 564-65 (7th Cir. 2002).
151. See Cheng, supra note 143, at 1297; Landolt, supra note 140, at 173-74.
152. Cheng, supra note 143, at 1267; see also Hernandez v. State, 116 S.W.3d 26, 32 (Tx.
Ct. Crim. App. 2003) (Keller, P.J., concurring); GEORGE, supra note 73, at 276.
153. See GEORGE, supra note 73, at 276. In fact, empirical research suggests this is in-
deed what happens. See Joshua Karton, The Arbitral Role in Contractual Interpretation, 6 J.
INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 4, nn.37-38 (2015).
154. See Landolt, supra note 140, at 176, 220-21; see also Sheppard, supra note 145, at
144-45.
155. See Landolt, supra note 140, at 176; see also Bernardo M. Cremades, Overcoming
the Clash of Legal Cultures: The Role of Interactive Arbitration, 14 ARB. INT’L 157, the text
accompanying nn.17-26 (1998).
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routine in the future.156 If that should indeed happen, the question then
arises as to whether an appellate award should be written differently than
an award at first instance.157 Unfortunately, there is no real analysis of this
issue from the arbitral perspective. Indeed, most of the appellate rules that
are currently in place do not discuss the form of the appellate award at
all.158
Fortunately, a functional analysis provides some useful insights into
this particular concern.159 For example, if an appellate tribunal is seen as
functionally equivalent to an appellate court, then an appellate award
might need to be written slightly differently than an award at first instance,
just as an appellate opinion is written slightly differently than a trial court
decision.160
Appellate opinions differ from decisions at first instance in a number
of ways, at least in the judicial context.161 Many of these differences arise
because appellate judges typically have an obligation to achieve an out-
come that is not only appropriate in the dispute at bar (justice in per-
sonam) but also in any similar cases that may arise in the future (justice in
156. See M. Scott Donahey, A Proposal for an Appellate Panel for the Uniform Domain
Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 18 J. INT’L ARB. 131, 131-34 (2001); Christian A. Garza &
Christopher D. Kratovil, Contracting for Private Appellate Review of Arbitration Awards, 19
APP. ADVOCATE 17 (2007) (discussing various rule sets); Erin E. Gleason, International Arbi-
tral Appeals: What Are We So Afraid Of? 7 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 269, 286-87 (2007); Roger
B. Jacobs, Compared and Contrasted: Skepticism and Promise in the Major Providers’ Appel-
late Arbitration Procedures, 33 ALT. TO HIGH COST LITIG. 19 (Feb. 2015); Margie-Lys Jamie,
An Appellate Body in Treaty-Based Investment Arbitration: Redefining the Investor-State Dis-
pute Settlement Mechanism, 21 SPAIN ARB. REV. / REVISTA DEL CLUB ESPAÑOL DEL ARBI-
TRAJE 93, 94-97 (2014); Platt, supra note 75, at 547-52; Mauro Rubino-Sammartano, An
International Arbitral Court of Appeal as an Alternative to Long Attacks and Recognition
Proceedings, 6 J. INT’L ARB. 181, 181-88 (1989); Hon. David B. Saxe, An Appellate Mecha-
nism in Arbitration, 86 N.Y. ST. B.J. 44, 45 (Nov./Dec. 2013) (supporting arbitral appeals in
some cases); Ten Cate, supra note 6, at 1111. The debate has been particularly pitched in the
context of investment arbitration, which raises somewhat different questions due to the
quasi-public nature of investor-state disputes. See Barry Appleton, The Song is Over: Why
It’s Time to Stop Talking About an International Investment Arbitration Appellate Body, 107
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 23, 23 (Apr. 3-6, 2013) (discussing an arbitral appellate procedure
created by international treaty); David A. Gantz, An Appellate Mechanism for Review of
Arbitral Decisions in Investor-State Disputes: Prospects and Challenges, 39 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT’L L. 39 (2006); Ian Laird & Rebecca Askew, Finality versus Consistency: Does Investor-
State Arbitration Need an Appellate System? 7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESSES 283, 286-87 (2005).
157. See supra note 87 (discussing nomenclature regarding arbitral decisions below).
158. See AAA Appellate Rules, supra note 86; CPR Appellate Rules, supra note 86; see
also Platt, supra note 75, at 547-52 (discussing arbitral appeals under the Spanish Arbitration
Act, the Rules of the Spanish Court of Arbitration, the Rules of the European Court of
Arbitration and the International Arbitration Chamber of Paris (Chambre Arbitrale de
Paris)). The one organization that does refer to the form of the appellate award does so only
at a very general level, simply stating that “[t]he Panel’s decision will consist of a concise
written explanation, unless all Parties agree otherwise.” JAMS Appellate Rules, supra note
86, Rule D.
159. See Michaels, supra note 56, at 342, 357 (describing functionalism).
160. See GEORGE, supra note 73, at 257 (considering appellate opinions in court).
161. See Strong, Writing, supra note 6, at 101-10.
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rem).162 However, this feature does not appear to translate to the arbitral
realm, since the duty to provide justice in rem is directly related to the role
that appellate opinions play in developing the rule of law and arbitral
awards do not generate precedent in the same way that judicial opinions
do.163
Appellate judges also have a heightened duty to include a detailed
description of the procedural history of the dispute so as to establish the
standard, scope and propriety of appellate review.164 This feature could
also be necessary in arbitration. However, a number of questions exist re-
garding the standard and scope of appellate review in arbitration.
Matters of scope are addressed, at least in some degree, by most ap-
pellate rule sets. Thus, for example, the American Arbitration Association
(AAA) indicates in its rules on appellate arbitration that “[a] party may
appeal on the grounds that the Underlying Award is based upon: (1) an
error of law that is material and prejudicial; or (2) determinations of fact
that are clearly erroneous.”165 Other arbitral organizations focus on simi-
lar criteria.166 However, these provisions could be difficult to implement
162. See GEORGE, supra note 73, at 275; Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 14.
163. See Strong, Writing, supra note 6, at 108-10; see also supra notes 68-69 and accom-
panying text. Although civil law jurisdictions do not adhere to precedent in quite the same
way that common law countries do, civil law countries still recognize the need to develop
consistent interpretations of the law. See DE CRUZ, supra note 72, at 70.
164. See Strong, Writing, supra note 6, at 116-17.
165. AAA Appellate Rules, supra note 86, Rule A-10. The AAA further indicates that:
(a) Within thirty (30) days of service of the last brief, the appeal tribunal shall take
one of the following actions:
1. adopt the Underlying Award as its own, or,
2. substitute its own award for the Underlying Award (incorporating those aspects
of the Underlying Award that are not vacated or modified), or,
3. request additional information and notify the parties of the tribunal’s exercise of
an option to extend the time to render a decision, not to exceed thirty (30) days.
The appeal tribunal may not order a new arbitration hearing or send the case back
to the original arbitrator(s) for corrections or further review.
Id. Rule A-19.
166. Thus, the CPR rules on appellate procedure state that:
8.2 If the Tribunal hears the Appeal, it may issue an Appellate Award modifying or
setting aside the Original Award, but only on the following grounds:
a. That the Original Award (i) contains material and prejudicial errors of law
of such a nature that it does not rest upon any appropriate legal basis, or (ii)
is based upon factual findings clearly unsupported by the record; or
b. That the Original Award is subject to one or more of the grounds set forth
in Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act for vacating an award. The Tribu-
nal does not have the power to remand the award.
8.3 If the Tribunal does not modify or set aside the Original Award pursuant to
Rule 8.2 above, it shall issue an Appellate Award approving the Original Award
and the Original Award shall be final as provided in Rule 8.6 below.
CPR Appellate Rules, supra note 86, Rule 8.
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in practice, given the problems associated with distinguishing between
findings of fact and conclusions of law.167
The situation is even more challenging with respect to questions relat-
ing to the standard of review, since only one arbitral organization – JAMS
– addresses the standard of review in its appellate rules.168 As a result, it is
by no means clear in most cases whether and to what extent appellate
arbitrators should defer to arbitrators at first instance as opposed to sim-
ply considering the matter de novo. In judicial appeals in the United
States, the appropriate standard is usually determined by reference to the
matter under review, with the three most frequently used standards – clear
error, abuse of discretion and plenary (de novo) review – typically relating
to evidentiary, discretionary and legal matters, respectively.169 However,
recent decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court have made that standard
increasingly difficult to apply.170 Other national laws could be similarly
problematic.
B. Issues Relating to the Framework
As important as process-oriented issues are, perhaps the most chal-
lenging issue in this area of law involves the framework for reasoned
awards. The following sub-sections therefore discuss various aspects of a
fully reasoned award, including core considerations relating to scope,
structure, and, to a lesser extent, style.
1. Style
Although this Article does not address issues relating to diction, sen-
tence structure, punctuation, and the like, some so-called elements of style
167. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1985); see also supra notes 54-55 and
accompanying text.
168. The JAMS rules on appellate procedures state
The Appeal Panel will apply the same standard of review that the first-level appel-
late court in the jurisdiction would apply to an appeal from the trial court decision.
The Appeal Panel will respect the evidentiary standard set forth in Rule 22(d) of
the JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules. The Panel may affirm, reverse or
modify an Award. The Panel may not remand to the original arbitrator(s), but may
re-open the record in order to review evidence that had been improperly excluded
by the Arbitrator(s) or evidence that is now necessary in light of the Panel’s inter-
pretation of the relevant substantive law. . . . The Panel’s decision will consist of a
concise written explanation, unless all Parties agree otherwise.
JAMS Appellate Rules, supra note 86, Rule D. However, JAMS does not address the scope
or trigger for review. See id.
169. See Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 30. Notably, the standard of review differs
from the scope of review. See GEORGE, supra note 73, at 297.
170. Recent decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court have permitted, if not required, de
novo analysis of certain mixed questions of law and fact. See Russell M. Coombs, A Third
Parallel Primrose Path: The Supreme Court’s Repeated, Unexplained, and Still Growing Regu-
lation of State Courts’ Criminal Appeals, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 541, 547-48. However, dis-
tinguishing questions of law from questions of fact is quite challenging. See Miller, 474 U.S. at
113-14; see also supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
Fall 2015] Reasoned Awards 31
have a significant effect on the substance of an award, since they affect not
just the mode of an author’s communication but the ability to communi-
cate effectively.171 Since the first duty of an arbitrator is to produce a
clear, internationally enforceable award, it is necessary to consider a few
stylistic concerns.172
The first point involves the audience for arbitral awards.173 Because
the parties “have an all-pervasive interest” in the outcome of the dis-
pute,174 conventional wisdom suggests that arbitrators should direct their
statements primarily if not exclusively to the litigants.175
This conclusion has significant repercussions for the style that an arbi-
trator adopts when writing an award, since parties who have taken the
trouble and expense of contracting for a reasoned award want to know not
only who won, but why.176 Most parties do not have extensive training in
the law, which means that arbitrators need to write awards that are “clear,
logical, unambiguous, and free of” legal jargon.177 Indeed, many experts
have recognized that “[t]he mark of a well-written opinion is that it is com-
prehensible to an intelligent layperson.”178 Furthermore, awards “should
not . . . be turned into briefs or vehicles for advocacy.”179
Although arbitral awards are directed primarily to the parties, arbitra-
tors need to keep other potential audience members in mind. For example,
an award may need to be read by a national court judge as part of a collat-
eral or enforcement proceeding.180 Not all judges are as knowledgeable
about the arbitral process as they could be, which suggests that an arbitra-
tor may need to explain the nuances of the governing law and arbitral
procedure so as to avoid any judicial misunderstandings.181 The possibility
171. See Standard Bent Glass Corp. v. Glassrobots Oy, 333 F.3d 440, 449 (3d Cir. 2003).
172. See Lloyd et al., supra note 3, at 20-21.
173. Knowing one’s audience is one of the fundamental rules of good writing, regard-
less of context. See Jeffrey A. Van Detta, The Decline and Fall of the American Judicial
Opinion, Part II: Back to the Future From the Roberts Court to Learned Hand – Segmenta-
tion, Audience, and the Opportunity of Justice Sotomayor, 13 BARRY L. REV. 29, 34 (2009)
[hereinafter Van Detta 2].
174. Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 17.
175. See Marx, supra note 5, at 23 (expanding the audience slightly); see generally Aldis-
ert et al., supra note 109, at 17 (discussing judicial opinions).
176. See Lloyd, supra note 3, at 40.
177. Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 18. Those who are writing an award in a second
language often must take additional steps to make sure that they are using foreign legal terms
properly and adhering to party expectations regarding the form and content of the award. See
STRONG ET AL., supra note 11, ch. 1; see also Lloyd, supra note 3, at 39.
178. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, JUDICIAL WRITING MANUAL: A POCKET GUIDE FOR
JUDGES 6 (2d ed., 2013) [hereinafter FJC MANUAL], http://www.fjc.gov.
179. Id. at 5.
180. See Lloyd et al., supra note 3, at 28.
181. Judges are often confused about the special nature of international commercial
arbitration. See STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 1, at 1. Numerous national and international
organizations are taking steps to address this issue. See S.I. Strong, Improving Judicial Per-
formance in Matters Involving International Arbitration, in DEFINING ISSUES IN INTERNA-
TIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (Julio César Betancourt ed.) (forthcoming 2016).
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of judicial confusion may be heightened in cases where the award is being
enforced across the common law/civil law divide. In those situations, the
arbitrator may wish to be particularly careful about making sure that the
award includes various elements that will be familiar to the enforcing
judge.182
An award may also be read by various private parties.183 For example,
an insurer may need to read an award to determine whether and to what
extent any damages granted by the arbitrator fall within the terms of a
business insurance policy.184 In these sorts of cases, an arbitrator may
want to be particularly clear about the nature of the underlying financial
calculations, including issues relating to taxes, interest and costs.185
The second stylistic issue to consider involves consistency and coher-
ence in relation to the citation of legal authorities.186 Advocates are often
advised to take their audience into account when drafting written submis-
sions in international commercial arbitration and, in particular, to make
sure that the presentation and discussion of legal materials take into ac-
count the various differences between the civil and common law.187 The
diversity of potential audience members for international commercial
awards suggests that arbitrators should follow this general rule as well,
since there is no way for the author of an international award to anticipate
all future uses of an award or the legal background of all potential audi-
ence members.188 As a result, international arbitrators must be very famil-
iar with the role that different legal authorities play in arbitration and the
various ways in which common law and civil law courts approach the cita-
tion, interpretation and application of legal materials.189
The third and final stylistic issue to mention involves the use of head-
ers. Commentators have noted that the length of international awards
makes it useful for arbitrators to make generous use of headings, sub-
headings and other types of subdivisions so as to increase the reader’s un-
derstanding of the structure of the award.190 It is also often “convenient to
182. See Lloyd et al., supra note 3, at 31; see also infra notes 186-89 and accompanying
text.
183. See Lloyd, supra note 3, at 41.
184. See Lloyd et al., supra note 3, at 29.
185. See id. at 33-34.
186. See Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 18.
187. See STRONG, RESEARCH, supra note 8, at 9-37 (discussing role of legal authority in
international commercial arbitration); S.I. Strong, Research in International Commercial Ar-
bitration: Special Skills, Special Sources, 20 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 119, 130-45 (2009) [herein-
after Strong, Sources] (discussing the role of legal authority in international commercial
arbitration).
188. See supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
189. STRONG, RESEARCH, supra note 8, at 9-37 (discussing role of legal authority in
international commercial arbitration); Karton, supra note 153, at n.6; see also Strong,
Sources, supra note 187, at 130-45 (same); STRONG ET AL., supra note 11, at chs. 4-6 (discuss-
ing the interpretation and use of legal authority in common law and civil law jurisdictions,
particularly in Spanish- and English-speaking countries).
190. See Fontaine, supra note 3, at 36; see also supra note 65 and accompanying text.
Fall 2015] Reasoned Awards 33
number the paragraphs or groups of paragraphs to facilitate cross-refer-
encing within the award.”191
2. Scope
One of the first things that an arbitrator must do when sitting down to
draft an award is decide the scope of the analysis.192 Conventional wisdom
suggests that a reasoned award should include a full discussion of “the
nature of the case, the issues, the facts, the law applicable to the facts, and
the legal reasoning applied to resolve the controversy.”193 This type of
content is necessary because the award “is the authoritative answer to the
questions raised by the [arbitration] . . . [and] should explain the reasons
upon which the [award] is to rest.”194
Although this description may be useful as a starting point, it fails to
provide sufficiently specific advice to arbitrators faced with drafting a rea-
soned award. In particular, this type of general guidance fails to recognize
how an award can and should be adapted in response to different types of
disputes.
i. A taxonomy of arbitral disputes
When drafting awards, arbitrators from both common law and civil
law jurisdictions would be well-advised to consider reviewing The Nature
of the Judicial Process, one of the seminal guides on judicial opinion-writ-
ing.195 In that book, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo sug-
gests that there are three different types of disputes that can result in a
judicial ruling and demonstrates how a reasoned ruling can and should be
adapted to take those underlying differences into account.196
“The first category . . . is comprised of those cases where ‘[t]he law
and its application alike are plain.’ Such cases ‘could not, with semblance
of reason, be decided in any way but one.’ ”197 Cardozo’s suggestion in
these sorts of situations is for the adjudicator to avoid drafting a lengthy
written opinion because such a ruling would contribute nothing to the ju-
risprudence in the field.198
Of course, an arbitrator who is contractually bound to render a rea-
soned award does not have the luxury of refusing to write a reasoned
award simply because the outcome of the dispute appears clear on its
191. Fontaine, supra note 3, at 36.
192. See FJC MANUAL, supra note 178, at 3-7 (discussing scope in the context of judicial
opinions).
193. GEORGE, supra note 73, at 32.
194. Id. at 33.
195. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1949).
196. See id. at 164-65; Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 8.
197. Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 8-9 (quoting CARDOZO, supra note 195, at 164-
65).
198. See CARDOZO, supra note 195, at 164-65; Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 8-9.
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face.199 However, Cardozo’s analysis provides a useful way for arbitrators
to save costs by suggesting that an award addressing this type of dispute
need not be very long or very detailed to be considered “reasoned.”200
Indeed, judges addressing matters falling within this first category of cases
usually render a summary judgment order that runs no more than a single
page in length.201 While an international award would need to be longer
than that due to a number of logistical requirements that arise out of the
special nature of international commercial arbitration, an arbitrator could
nevertheless be quite succinct in the analytical section and still produce an
award that could be considered fully reasoned under the circumstances.202
The second category of cases described by Cardozo involves situations
where “the rule of law is certain, and the application alone doubt-
ful.” In such cases,
[a] complicated record must be dissected, the narratives of
witnesses, more or less incoherent and unintelligible, must be
analyzed, to determine whether a given situation comes
within one district or another upon the chart of rights and
wrongs. . . . Often these cases . . . provoke difference of opin-
ion among judges. Jurisprudence remains untouched, how-
ever, regardless of the outcome.203
In these situations, Cardozo suggests rendering a non-precedential ju-
dicial opinion.204 On one level, this sort of advice may not seem helpful to
arbitrators, since arbitral awards are already considered non-preceden-
tial.205 However, closer examination of the nature of a non-precedential
judicial opinion provides useful lessons for international arbitrators.
Judges faced with this second category of cases typically issue a memo-
randum opinion.206 These documents are slightly more discursive than the
summary orders used in Cardozo’s first category of cases and provide a
short description of how the court arrived at its decision, even though they
199. See CARDOZO, supra note 195, at 164.
200. Writing an award can be a time-consuming task and an extremely expensive one in
situations where arbitrators are paid by the hour. See Stewart, supra note 107, at 39 (noting
the length of time it takes to write an award).
201. See CARDOZO, supra note 195, at 164; Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 8; see also
FJC MANUAL, supra note 178, app. B (suggesting that these types of orders include a brief
statement of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, but without a detailed explanation of
why the court reached the outcome that it did).
202. See Lloyd et al., supra note 3, at 29-31 (describing various logistical requirements
and basic data needs in international commercial awards); see also infra notes 253-54 and
accompanying text.
203. Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 8-9 (quoting CARDOZO, supra note 195, at 164-
65).
204. See CARDOZO, supra note 195, at 164-65; Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 8-9.
205. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
206. See CARDOZO, supra note 195, at 164; see also Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 8,
11.
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do not include a detailed discussion of the facts or a comprehensive expla-
nation of the legal rationales underlying the decision.207 Although arbitra-
tors are again bound by their contractual duty to provide a fully reasoned
award, Cardozo’s taxonomy suggests that analyses in this second category
of cases can and should focus on those elements that are most in conten-
tion (that is, the facts) while spending less time on those matters that are
not really debatable (that is, the law).208 By focusing on what is truly at
issue and avoiding the notion that a reasoned award in international com-
mercial arbitration requires exhaustive analysis of every nuance of the dis-
pute, arbitrators can operate in an efficient, timely and cost-effective
manner without jeopardizing the enforceability of the award or the par-
ties’ interest in understanding how and why the result was obtained.209
Indeed, a number of civil law legal systems have shown that length has
little to do with whether a legal ruling can be considered reasoned.210
Cardozo then goes on to discuss his “third and final category” of cases,
which is the only one he believes should generate a fully reasoned rul-
ing.211 This category
is comprised of cases “where a decision one way or the other, will
count for the future, will advance or retard, sometimes much,
sometimes little, the development of the law. . . .” From such
cases, each modestly articulating a narrow rule, emerge the princi-
ples that form the backbone of a court’s jurisprudence and war-
rant full-length, signed published opinions.212
Some aspects of Cardozo’s analysis (for example, statements about
“the development of the law”) do not apply to arbitration.213 However,
Cardozo’s description of this third category of cases is nevertheless useful
because it helps arbitrators identify those types of disputes that merit a
detailed analysis of both the facts and the law.214 As a result, awards fall-
ing into this category will probably be somewhat longer than those in the
207. See GEORGE, supra note 73, at 325-26; Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 11; see also
FJC MANUAL, supra note 178, app. A.
208. See CARDOZO, supra note 195, at 164; see also Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 8,
11.
209. See Fontaine, supra note 3, at 34. The international legal and business communities
have expressed concern about the time it takes many arbitrators to generate their awards. See
Berwin Leighton Paisner, International Arbitration: Research Based Report on Perceived De-
lay in the Arbitration Process 15-19 (2012), https://www.blplaw.com/media/pdfs/Reports/
BLP_International_Arbitration_Survey_Delay_in_the_Arbitration_Process_July_2012.pdf.
210. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text; see also BORN, supra note 2, at 3041-
42 (noting that “in some instances, longer is not better”).
211. Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 8-9 (quoting CARDOZO, supra note 195, at 164-
65).
212. Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 8-9 (quoting CARDOZO, supra note 195, at 164-
65); see also GEORGE, supra note 73, at 32-34 (discussing types of judicial writings).
213. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
214. See CARDOZO, supra note 195, at 164-65.
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previous two categories, since the legal and factual issues are both more
complicated.215
Although Cardozo’s taxonomy is useful in distinguishing different
types of disputes, it does not address a number of more detailed issues,
such as how a judge or arbitrator is to distinguish between a factual finding
and a legal conclusion.216 That particular analysis is extremely challenging
even for experienced decision-makers, since “the appropriate methodol-
ogy . . . has been, to say the least, elusive.”217 This matter is discussed in
more detail in the following subsection.
ii. Distinguishing between factual findings and legal conclusions
When considered in the abstract, distinguishing between factual find-
ings and legal conclusions appears relatively easy. For example, “[f]indings
of fact may be defined as those facts which are deduced from the evidence
and which are found by the . . . [arbitrator] to be essential to the judgment
rendered in the case.”218 Conclusions of law, on the other hand, “are
drawn by the . . . [arbitrator] through the exercise of his [or her] legal
judgment from those facts he [or she] has found previously as the trier of
fact. . . .”219
As straightforward as these definitions appear, they can be quite chal-
lenging to apply in practice.220 The situation is further exacerbated in the
international context by virtue of certain differences between common law
and civil law analyses. For example, it has been said that
[a] civilian system differs from a common law system much as ra-
tionalism differs from empiricism or deduction from induction.
The civilian naturally reasons from principles to instances, the
common lawyer from instances to principles. The civilian puts his
faith in syllogisms, the common lawyer in precedents; the first si-
lently asking himself as each new problem arises, “What should
we do this time?” and the second asking aloud in the same situa-
tion, “What did we do last time?” . . . The instinct of a civilian is to
systematize. The working rule of the common lawyer is solvitur
ambulando.221
215. See supra notes 197-210 and accompanying text.
216. See CARDOZO, supra note 195, at 164-65.
217. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1985) (citations omitted); see also GEORGE,
supra note 73, at 235-38 (including examples).
218. GEORGE, supra note 73, at 188 (noting findings of fact are “a form of judicial
inquiry”).
219. Id. at 189 (noting “[w]hen the judge considers the facts and draws the legal conclu-
sion . . . [the statement] becomes a conclusion of law.”).
220. See Miller, 474 U.S. at 113-14.
221. Thomas Mackay Cooper, The Common and the Civil Law – A Scot’s View, 63
HARV. L. REV. 468, 470-71 (1950).
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Another way of describing the differences between the two legal sys-
tems is by recognizing that the common law places
its faith in experience rather than in abstractions. It is a frame of
mind which prefers to go forward cautiously on the basis of expe-
rience from this case or that case to the next case, as justice in
each case seems to require, instead of seeking to refer everything
back to supposed universals. It is a frame of mind which is not
ambitious to deduce the decision for the case in hand from a pro-
position formulated universally . . . . It is the . . . habit of dealing
with things as they arise instead of anticipating them by abstract
universal formulas [as is the case with the civil law].222
Differences in the nature of common law and civil law analysis can
have a significant effect on how an arbitrator writes an award. Indeed,
both the form and the content of an arbitral award will likely be influ-
enced by the legal system with which an arbitrator is most familiar, at least
to some extent.223 For example, arbitrators from common law jurisdictions
often spend a significant amount of time discussing the underlying facts
and analyzing legal precedents while arbitrators from civil law jurisdictions
focus more heavily on categorizing the type of legal issues at stake during
the initial stages of the analysis.224
This is not to say that an arbitrator cannot or should not adopt a more
blended perspective in appropriate circumstances.225 In fact, the most suc-
cessful international arbitrators in the world are renowned for precisely
that ability.226 However, it can be difficult for novice arbitrators to over-
come their early training and learn how to reflect an appropriately inter-
national perspective in their awards.227
222. Roscoe Pound, What Is the Common Law?, in THE FUTURE OF THE COMMON LAW
3, 19 (1937), quoted in ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 67, at 259.
223. See Lloyd et al., supra note 3, at 20.
224. See id.; see also Bergholtz, supra note 91, at 42 (discussing the issue in the context
of judicial proceedings).
225. This approach cannot only be useful in communicating the arbitrator’s rationale to
the parties, it can be helpful in smoothing the path to enforcement. See Lloyd et al., supra
note 3, at 31 (“If a national court has ever to examine an award, for example for the purposes
of recognition or setting aside, it will naturally be less likely to be critical if the reasoning
adopts a pattern with which it is familiar.”).
226. See Emmanuel Gaillard, Sociology of International Arbitration, 31 ARB. INT’L 1, 8
(2015) (listing most popular international arbitrators in the world).
227. See Helena Whalen-Bridge, The Reluctant Comparativist: Teaching Common Law
Reasoning to Civil Law Students and the Future of Comparative Legal Skills, 58 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 364, 368-69 (2008). While an arbitrator should never pretend to be an expert in for-
eign law, that person cannot ignore the governing law simply because he or she is not quali-
fied in that jurisdiction. However, each arbitrator was intentionally selected so as to be able
to bring his or her unique technical or legal skills to bear on the problem at hand, resulting in
a more blended analysis of the law and the facts at issue. See BORN, supra note 2, at 1638;
Cremades, supra note 155, at 169-70; Miles, supra note 35, at 39-41. Arbitrators in interna-
tional commercial arbitration may not only be qualified in a jurisdiction different than the
one whose law controls the dispute, they may be qualified as lawyers in no jurisdiction what-
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Perhaps the best way to explain how this type of comparative method-
ology can be applied in international commercial arbitration is through an
example involving a situation where an arbitrator has been asked to apply
the substantive law of a country that not only differs from the law with
which the arbitrator is most familiar but that falls on the other side of the
common law-civil law divide. In these types of cases, the arbitrator needs
to adopt certain comparative legal skills to be sure that he or she is ascer-
taining, interpreting and applying the appropriate legal standard.228
Thus, for instance, a French-qualified arbitrator who is faced with a
dispute governed by U.S. law might want to adopt more of a common law
methodology when seeking to ascertain the governing legal principles.229
In so doing, the arbitrator would likely give considerable weight to case
law in his or her deliberations and drafting and might also place a stronger
emphasis on factual considerations than he or she would normally do.230
Finally, the arbitrator might consider discussing how the facts in the case
generated the legal principles chosen to govern the dispute.231
Similarly, a U.S.-qualified arbitrator faced with a dispute governed by
French law might want to approach the dispute from more of a civil law
perspective.232 In so doing, the arbitrator would likely rely heavily on
scholarly commentary when interpreting and applying various statutes and
would avoid focusing exclusively on case law as a guide to interpreta-
tion.233 Similarly, the arbitrator might interpret legislation from more of a
purposive or teleological perspective rather than rely on the four-corners
or plain meaning doctrine,234 and would perhaps aim to derive the appli-
soever. See Miles, supra note 35, at 39-41; see also BORN, supra note 2, at 1679, 1745 (noting
that only some jurisdictions require arbitrators to be legally qualified).
228. See Strong, Sources, supra note 187, at 145-48. Interestingly, parties have been
known to require arbitrators to apply common law and civil law principles simultaneously.
See Rusty Park, Michael Mustill: A Reminiscence (July 20, 2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/
arbint/aiv044 363-365 (discussing the Channel Tunnel Case, Channel Group v. Balfour Beatty
Ltd. [1993] Adj. L. R. 01/21, which involved a contract requiring application of common
principles of English and French law); see also Karton, supra note 153, at nn.45-46 (discussing
the ICC awards in the Channel Tunnel Case, referred to in this example as the Eurotunnel
cases).
229. See Strong, Sources, supra note 187, at 145-48; see also Karton, supra note 153, at
38-39.
230. See ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 67, at 259.
231. See id.
232. See id.; see generally Friesen, supra note 60, at 7-11. One commentator has sug-
gested that “a civil law perspective on contractual interpretation predominates” in interna-
tional commercial arbitration. See Karton, supra note 153, at 16.
233. See Strong, Sources, supra note 187, at 145.
234. See S.I. Strong, Beyond the Self-Execution Analysis: Rationalizing Constitutional,
Treaty, and Statutory Interpretation in International Commercial Arbitration, 53 VA. J. INT’L
L. 499, 569-71 (2013).
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cable legal standard primarily by reference to various legal principles
rather than through factual analogies.235
Although this approach may seem complicated and perhaps somewhat
confusing to those who have not undertaken such analyses, all of the un-
derlying interpretive techniques are used in both common law and civil
law jurisdictions, even if conventional wisdom tends to associate particular
methodologies more closely with one or the other of the two legal tradi-
tions.236 Therefore, this approach does not require arbitrators to abandon
their longstanding professional expertise but instead encourages them to
supplement their analysis by incorporating techniques and authorities that
are used and valued in the legal system whose law controls.237
Notably, arbitrators cannot hope to hide their evaluative approach,
since any and all influences on the arbitrator’s analytical methodology will
necessarily affect the manner in which the final award is written, both as a
matter of style and content.238 Indeed, commentators have long recog-




As important as questions of style and scope may be, the real chal-
lenge for those charged with writing an arbitral award involves structure.
235. See Strong, Sources, supra note 187, at 145. This is not to say that different inter-
pretive techniques may not lead to different outcomes, since that is obviously the case. See
Karton, supra note 153, at 25-27.
236. See Strong, Sources, supra note 187, at 145-50.
237. The technique is explained thusly by Bernardo Cremades, a highly esteemed inter-
national arbitrator:
[A]rbitrators display their real expertise and professionalism at the time of making
their decision, placing aside their individual cultural background. Thus, the truly
international arbitrator is one who is immediately able to distinguish what is purely
local from that which is outside his own national frontiers and within a globalized
economy. His professionalism leads his decision to be independent from the “bag
and baggage” of the system or national systems from which he originates: da mihi
factum et tibi dabo ius. In the final decision, he is not conditioned either by his
geographical origin or by education, race, religion or even personal sympathies.
Here lies the true professionalism of the international arbitrator who knows how
to face the expectations of the parties, who have chosen him for his impartiality
and neutrality.
Cremades, supra note 155, at 170 (citation omitted).
238. Bergholtz, supra note 91, at 42 (noting that “[i]n the grounds of legal decisions
form and substance, procedural form and substantive law, meet”); see also Carl
Baudenbacher, Some Remarks on the Method of Civil Law, 34 TEX. INT’L L.J. 333, 348-49
(1999); Cremades, supra note 155, at 161; Friesen, supra note 60, at 7-11. Although some
commentators have suggested that arbitrators do not explicitly describe their interpretive
approach, that does not mean that the interpretive methodology cannot be gleaned from the
structure, style and content of the opinion. See Karton, supra note 153, at 7-10.
239. See Bergholtz, supra note 91, at 42.
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Without a good structural framework, an arbitrator cannot hope to per-
suade or even inform his or her readers.240
Some structural concerns have already been resolved by the interna-
tional arbitral community.241 Thus, as noted previously, reasoned awards
in international commercial arbitration are usually quite lengthy and tend
to adopt an approach reminiscent of judicial opinions generated by com-
mon law and certain civil law courts.242 As a result, international awards
are often longer and more formal than arbitral awards rendered in domes-
tic proceedings, even in cases that feature legal and factual issues that are
as complicated as those arising in the cross-border context.243
The length of international awards can be somewhat problematic,
given that arbitration is supposed to reduce the time and costs associated
with resolving legal disputes and writing a fully reasoned award is often
both expensive and time-consuming.244 Indeed, Gary Born, one of the
leading commentators in the field, has recognized that “in some instances,
longer is not better.”245
However, the detailed analysis reflected in many international awards
can be defended on several grounds. For example, an arbitrator may per-
ceive a heightened need to explain international commercial arbitration’s
uniquely blended procedural approach to those who may be unfamiliar
with the process.246 Alternatively, an arbitrator may wish to demonstrate
240. See STRONG & DESNOYER, supra note 48, ch. 1.
241. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
242. See Lloyd et al., supra note 3, at 29-31; see supra notes 62-64 and accompanying
text.
243. See STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 1, at 3-6. For example, class arbitrations are often
as complex as international commercial arbitrations, with similar amounts in dispute. See S.I.
Strong, Does Class Arbitration “Change the Nature” of Arbitration? Stolt-Nielsen, AT&T and
a Return to First Principles, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 201, 262-66 (2012). However, class
awards often adopt a different structure and tone than international awards. Compare Con-
tractor v. Producer (Zam. v. Zam.), International Chamber of Commerce Case No. 16484,
Final Award (2011), XXXIX Y.B. COMM. ARB. 216 (2014) (reflecting an international award)
with Hausner v. United, Clause Constr. Award, AAA Class Arbitration Docket, http://
www.adr.org (searching class arbitration docket under party names).
244. See Stewart, supra note 107, at 39 (noting the length of time it takes to write an
award). Notably, some arbitrators in international commercial arbitration are not paid by the
hour. See ICC ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 50, Appx. III, art. IV (basing arbitrator’s
fees on amount in dispute).
245. BORN, supra note 2, at 3041-42.
246. Enforcing courts often need to assess the fairness of the arbitral procedure, which
will be reflected in certain aspects of the award. Thus, it has been said that
[n]ational courts throughout the world also expect or require certain fundamental
principles to be followed by arbitral tribunals, such as the right of a party to know
and to be able to deal with the case against it. The award must make it clear that
these principles have been observed by the arbitral tribunal and how the tribunal
did so.
Lloyd et al., supra note 3, at 24-25; see also New York Convention, supra note 77, art. V.
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his or her faithfulness to the contractual obligation to produce a reasoned
award.247
These are both reasonable justifications for longer and more detailed
awards. However, the real reason for the length of most international
awards may lie in the nature of a reasoned award itself. For example, ex-
perts have suggested that an award in international commercial arbitration
should inform the reader that the arbitral tribunal has acted in a
judicial manner, not just in the way in which it heard the dispute
but in the manner in which the dispute was decided, i.e., the rea-
soning must be both thorough and self-sufficient. The award must
therefore be – and be seen to be – the product of compliance by
the arbitral tribunal with the fundamental principles of the
processes by which civil disputes are to be resolved (insofar as
they apply to arbitration). Thus the arbitral tribunal must allow
each party the opportunity to answer the case against it and also
any pertinent point raised by the arbitral tribunal on its own initi-
ative, as well as to deal with any fact or allegation brought to the
attention of the tribunal.248
These requirements have significant ramifications with respect to the
structure of the award, as discussed in the next sub-section.
ii. A classical structural framework
As mentioned previously, arbitrators do not need to adhere to any
pre-established structural norms when drafting international awards.249
Instead, arbitrators simply need to fulfill various functional require-
ments250 that may be imposed privately, institutionally251 or as a result of
the special nature of arbitration.252
247. See Lloyd et al., supra note 3, at 27 (“The arbitral tribunal ought to facilitate volun-
tary compliance [with an award] by producing an award which explains clearly and persua-
sively how and why it has arrived at its conclusions.”); see also Bergholtz, supra note 91, at
45, 48 (noting that judges also need to demonstrate their faithfulness with legal authority so
as to avoid being perceived as arbitrary). These obligations include the duty to comply with
necessary procedural rules as well as the duty to comply with the substantive law chosen
explicitly or implicitly by the parties. See BORN, supra note 2, at 1963-64; Strong, Procedural
Limits, supra note 93, at 1089-1109 (noting the limits on procedural and substantive auton-
omy in international commercial arbitration).
248. Lloyd et al., supra note 3, at 21.
249. See id. at 20.
250. See BORN, supra note 2, at 3037-45.
251. For example, the ICC has a number of form requirements that may not apply in
other types of proceedings. See Lloyd et al., supra note 3, at 23; see also BORN, supra note 2,
at 3030-37.
252. For example, an arbitrator must be aware of any requirements imposed as a result
of the national law of the seat or by the New York Convention. See New York Convention,
supra note 77; Lloyd, supra note 3, at 41. Authorities also suggest that an arbitrator should be
aware of any requirements imposed at the place where the award is likely to be enforced. See
Fontaine, supra note 3, at 31-32.
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A number of these elements are relatively straightforward. For example,
an international award should include:
• the names of the arbitrator(s);
• the manner in which the tribunal came to be appointed;
• the names and addresses of the parties (including any company or
commercial registration number) and of their legal or other
representatives;
• how the dispute arose (and thus why an arbitral award is required);
• the terms of the arbitration agreement (and any variations) – these
are best set out in full as they establish the basis for the jurisdiction
of the arbitral tribunal; . . .
• the place of the arbitration together with how it came to be chosen;
• the law or rules applicable to the merits of the dispute and whether
they were agreed by the parties or decided by the arbitral tribunal
(in the latter case, the reasons considered to be appropriate by the
arbitral tribunal must be given at some point in the award); . . .
• the procedural rules agreed [by the parties] . . . or determined by
the arbitral tribunal;
• the language or languages of the arbitration (and any departures
therefrom and the reason for any such deviation);
• the principal chronology both of the dispute and of the
proceedings . . . ;
• the steps that the arbitral tribunal took, in accordance with the
procedural rules, to ascertain the facts of the case;
• the dates of any evidentiary hearings and previous awards; [and]
• the date when the proceedings were closed.253
This material, which usually appears at the beginning of the arbitral
award, is relatively easy to draft, which obviates the need for further dis-
cussion herein.254 Instead, this Article will focus on issues relating to the
arbitrator’s legal reasoning and factual analysis, since those are the ele-
ments that are the most challenging for both new and experienced
arbitrators.255
253. Lloyd et al., supra note 3, at 29-30 (footnotes omitted). Other logistical informa-
tion, such as that relating to the appointment of a tribunal expert, can be included in this
section if necessary. See id. at 30. This material is necessary in case the award ever needs to
be enforced internationally and therefore should be presented in a strictly informational and
non-controversial manner. See id.
254. See id. at 29.
255. See id. at 31-37.
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Although very little material exists on how arbitrators should draft the
reasoning section of an international award,256 extensive commentary ex-
ists regarding judicial reasoning.257 While arbitral awards do not necessa-
rily have to reflect the same degree and depth of analysis as judicial
decisions and opinions, it nevertheless appears useful to consider the vari-
ous recommendations made to judges in case the advice is transferrable to
arbitration.258 In so doing, it will of course be necessary to take into ac-
count the various functional differences between arbitral awards and judi-
cial rulings.259
It is impossible to provide a comprehensive analysis of every type of
reasoned analysis, since every nation takes its own particular approach to
judicial writing.260 However, one popular multicultural model is based on
the classical principles of Greco-Roman rhetoric.261 The long-standing ap-
peal of this particular approach, combined with its proven effectiveness in
a variety of countries and contexts, could prove very useful for those seek-
256. See id.; see also supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text.
257. See supra note 38 (listing authorities).
258. See BORN, supra note 2, at 3044.
259. See Michaels, supra note 56, at 342, 357; see also supra note 57 and accompanying
text.
260. See FJC MANUAL, supra note 178 (United States); CHERYL THOMAS, REVIEW OF
JUDICIAL TRAINING IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS 8, 16 (May 2006), http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/
judicial-institute/files/Judicial_Training_and_Education_in_other_Jurisdictions.pdf (discuss-
ing judicial writing programs around the world and noting the United States, Canada and
Spain are leaders in judicial education, offering numerous courses in “judge craft,” which
includes judicial writing); see also EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EUROPEAN JUDICIAL TRAINING,
Good Training Practices, https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_good_training_practices-311-
en.do?clang=en#n03 (noting courses on decision writing from Estonia and the Netherlands);
NATIONAL JUDICIAL INSTITUTE – INSTITUT NACIONAL DE LA MAGISTRATURE, Judicial Edu-
cation Course Calendar, https://www.nji-inm.ca/index.cfm/publications/ (offering advanced
courses in opinion-writing); Susan Glazebrook, Restoring Image and Trust Through Judicial
Training on Communication, 2 JUD. EDUC. & TRAINING: J. INT’L ORG. JUD. TRAINING 50,
55-56 (2014) (discussing judicial writing in New Zealand); Plan Docente de Formación Inicial
66a Promoción de la Carrera Judicial, Curso 2014-2016 Escuela Judicial 22 (2014), http://
www.poderjudicial.es/stfls/CGPJ/ESCUELA%20JUDICIAL/FORMACIÓN%20INICIAL/
PLANES%20DE%20FORMACIÓN/FICHERO/20141222%20Plan%20Docente%2066P
Cataleg%20justicia%20nou%20(negro).swf (noting the need to provide training in writing
reasoned judicial rulings during the initial training (formación inicial) at the Spanish judicial
training institute (La Escuela Judicial, part of the Consejo General de Poder Judicial)).
261. See RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, OPINION WRITING 77-82 (2d ed. 2009); FJC MANUAL,
supra note 178, at 13; GEORGE, supra note 73, at 291-304; MAILHOT & CARNWATH, supra
note 31, at 37-38; EDWARD D. RE, APPELLATE OPINION WRITING 11 (1975), http://www.
fjc.gov; SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, supra note 127, at 129-30 (providing an outline of a judg-
ment); Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 24; George Rose Smith, A Primer of Opinion Writ-
ing, for Four New Judges, 21 ARK. L. REV. 197, 204 (1967); see also Justice Roslyn Atkinson,
Judicial Writing, AUSTL. INST. OF JUD. ADMIN. (2002), http://www.aija.org.au/Mag02/Roslyn
%20Atkinson.pdf (Australia; citing Greco-Roman principles and citing the FLAC (facts-law-
application-conclusion) system, which is similar to analytical techniques used in the United
States and England).
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ing to rationalize drafting techniques in international commercial
arbitration.262
Indeed, close examination of existing awards suggests that this ap-
proach is already quite common in the international realm.263
This model includes five different sections:
• an opening paragraph or orientation (exordium);
• a summary of the issues to be discussed (divisio);
• a recitation of material adjudicative facts (narratio);
• an analysis of the legal issues (confirmatio a. confutatio); and
• a conclusion indicating the holding or disposition (peroratio).264
Each section is considered in more detail below.
a. Orientation (exordium)
The classical principles of rhetoric suggest that every reasoned award
should begin with an opening or orientation section that puts the legal and
factual discussion into context and lets the reader know what is to
come.265 This sort of roadmap or executive summary should include all of
the critical information about the case and attempt to “pique the opinion
reader’s interest with its language.”266
Experts suggest that a well-written orientation section should provide
answers to six key questions known to every journalist: who, what, when,
where, why and how.267 “Who” is perhaps the easiest of the questions to
answer, since it simply requires the arbitrator to identify the parties and
their counsel.268 If the matter is being heard on arbitral appeal, then the
orientation section should also indicate who prevailed in the first
proceeding.269
262. See Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 11-14 (noting that five parts are necessary for
an opinion); Van Detta 2, supra note 173, at 32.
263. See Fontaine, supra note 3, at 34-35 (writing from a civil law perspective); Lloyd,
supra note 3, at 41-45 (writing from a common law perspective); Lloyd et al., supra note 3, at
29-37 (writing from a mixed common law-civil law perspective).
264. See Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 24; see also ALDISERT, supra note 261, at 77-
78; FJC MANUAL, supra note 178, at 13; GEORGE, supra note 73, at 291-304; MAILHOT &
CARNWATH, supra note 31, at 37-38; RE, supra note 261, at 11; SUPREME COURT OF OHIO,
supra note 127, at 129-30; Smith, supra note 261, at 204.
265. See Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 24-25 (noting that five parts are necessary for
an opinion). Some commentators refer to this section as “the nature of the action.” GEORGE,
supra note 73, at 162.
266. Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 26. For examples of both good and bad orienta-
tion paragraphs, see Smith, supra note 261, at 205 (citing Johnson v. Smith, 219 S.W. 2d 926
(Ark. 1949); McClure Ins. Agency v. Hudson, 377 S.W. 2d 814 (Ark. 1964); Garner v. Am-
sler, 377 S.W. 2d 872 (Ark. 1964); and Dereuisseaux v. Bell, 378 S.W. 2d 208 (Ark. 1964)).
267. See GEORGE, supra note 73, at 12; Smith, supra note 261, at 204.
268. See Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 26.
269. See id.
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The concept of “what” is also relatively straightforward and simply
requires the arbitrator to identify the major factual and legal issues that
are at stake.270 Thus, for example, an arbitrator might indicate that the
case involved a claim in negligence and that the primary issue in conten-
tion involved whether the respondent owed a legal duty to the claimant.271
This section should also outline any remedies or relief sought by the par-
ties in their claims or counterclaims.272
“When” refers to the time of the legal injury so as to establish whether
the dispute has been brought in a timely manner.273 Timing may also be
important to the calculation of damages or interest274 or to the issue of
whether an arbitral appeal has been brought within the proper period of
time.275
“Where” can be considered a jurisdictional question. For example, it is
critical in an international proceeding that the arbitrator identifies the ar-
bitral seat.276 Appellate arbitrators may wish to establish the provenance
of the dispute so as to demonstrate that appellate jurisdiction exists.277
The next question relates to “why” the matter has been brought to the
arbitrator’s attention. Sometimes this issue will have already been an-
swered as a result of the “who,” “what,” “when” or “where” analyses.278 If
the motivation for the suit has not already been addressed, the arbitrator
should discuss the matter independently, since the question of “why is this
matter being brought before this arbitrator at this time” is fundamental to
every proceeding.279
“How” can be interpreted in two ways. First, “how” can refer to the
manner in which the issue reached the arbitrator.280 Because arbitration is
a creature of contract, it is important for an arbitrator to demonstrate that
all the necessary requirements have been met before taking jurisdiction
over the dispute.281
270. See id.
271. The tort of negligence typically requires the plaintiff to establish the existence of a
legal duty, breach of that duty, legal causation, factual causation and damages, at least in the
United States. See Detraz v. Lee, 950 So. 2d 557, 562 (La. 2007). Only some of these issues
will be in doubt in any particular case. See STRONG, HOW TO WRITE, supra note 31, at 39.
272. See Lloyd et al., supra note 3, at 31.
273. See GEORGE, supra note 73, at 12.
274. See id.
275. Parties typically have between fourteen and thirty days from the date the underly-
ing award is issued or finalized to file an appeal. See AAA Appellate Rules, supra note 86,
Rule A-3 (providing for thirty days); CPR Appellate Rules, supra note 86, Rule 2.1 (provid-
ing for thirty days); JAMS Appellate Rules, supra note 86, Procedure B(i) (providing for
fourteen days).
276. See Lloyd et al., supra note 3, at 29-30.
277. See Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 26.
278. See GEORGE, supra note 73, at 12; Smith, supra note 261, at 204.
279. See GEORGE, supra note 73, at 12; Smith, supra note 261, at 204.
280. See GEORGE, supra note 73, at 12; Smith, supra note 261, at 204.
281. See Lloyd et al., supra note 3, at 29-30.
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Second, “how” can refer to the manner in which the arbitrator has
decided to rule. While some arbitrators believe that withholding the result
until the end of the award increases the reader’s anticipation, there is little
to be gained by not indicating the outcome of the dispute in the orienta-
tion paragraph, since most readers who do not find the outcome at the
beginning of the award will simply turn to the dispositive section at the
end of the document.282 As a result, most authorities suggest that the ori-
entation paragraph should include a reference to the holding or disposi-
tion “as a guide to [the] intelligent reading” of the award.283
When announcing the outcome of the dispute, either in the orienta-
tion paragraph or the dispositive section, arbitrators should avoid using
the passive tense or other indirect language (such as “I believe”), since
such phrases “dilute the vigour which should characterize the result.”284 A
clear reference to the outcome of the case may be particularly important
in “splintered” awards in which a claim is denied in part and granted in
part.285 Disputes with multiple opinions offer similar opportunities for
confusion, which suggests a heightened need for a well-written orientation
paragraph.286
Although the orientation section is comprehensive in scope, it should
be very brief.287 Learning to write a good orientation takes practice, and
even experienced arbitrators spend considerable time getting the wording
just right.288 However, the benefits of a clear, concise opening justify the
time spent.
b. Summary of legal issues (divisio)
The second section of a reasoned award involves a summary of the
various legal issues that will be discussed in the body of the document.289
This section focuses exclusively on legal issues, since factual issues are con-
sidered separately.290
282. See GEORGE, supra note 73, at 301; MAILHOT & CARNWATH, supra note 31, at 53;
Lloyd et al., supra note 3, at 35 (“The award must contain, often at the very end, a section
containing the dispositive part of the award.”).
283. Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 27 (quoting B.E. WITKIN, MANUAL ON APPEL-
LATE COURT OPINIONS § 57, at 93 (1977)).
284. MAILHOT & CARNWATH, supra note 31, at 54.
285. See SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, supra note 127, at 150 (containing example).
286. See Robin Kundis Craig, Agencies Interpreting Courts Interpreting Statutes: The
Deference Conundrum of a Divided Supreme Court, 61 EMORY L.J. 1, 7-10 (2011) (discussing
the difficulties associated with plurality opinions); Justin Marceau, Plurality Decisions: Up-
ward-Flowing Precedent and Acoustic Separation, 45 CONN. L. REV. 933, 935-37 (2013)
(same).
287. See Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 26.
288. See id.
289. See id. at 28.
290. An issue can be defined as “a point in dispute between two or more parties.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2009). Strictly separating the legal and factual analysis is a skill
that is first taught in law school, at least in the United States and the United Kingdom. See
STRONG, HOW TO WRITE, supra note 31, at 53-97 (discussing legal education in England and
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Some common law arbitrators may worry about discussing legal issues
outside their factual context, thinking that such an analysis is too academic
and treatise-like.291 However, the goal in this subsection is not to discuss
the law in a vacuum but rather to provide a clear analysis of the legal
dispute that will ultimately be informed by the material adjudicative
facts.292 This technique not only brings the discussion of legal concerns
down to a manageable size, it helps the reader understand the materiality
of the facts that that are presented later in the decision or opinion.293 As
one expert notes, “[t]he effect is like reading a review of a movie before
seeing it, so that one knows what to look for in the theater.”294 Arbitrators
from civil law systems are less likely to be troubled by this particular ele-
ment of the award, since they have a great deal of experience in catego-
rizing legal disputes as an initial matter.295
Some disputes present more than one legal issue.296 In those cases, an
arbitrator can either present all of the potential issues in a single summary
paragraph or split up the various issues and introduce them in separate
paragraphs under topic sentences introducing individual sub-issues.297 Ei-
ther approach is fine, so long as the structure is clear to the reader. The
arbitrator should also note if any changes have been made to the claims or
counterclaims and how those changes came about (for example, through a
party amendment to the pleadings or as a result of a decision by the
arbitrator).298
When discussing legal issues, it is usually not necessary to address eve-
rything raised by counsel in detail, since not every point will be equally
contentious.299 While it is important to address any claim, defense, error
or objection that has been properly raised, some concerns do not merit
lengthy analysis and can be handled in a relatively succinct manner.300
Furthermore, it is important to separate the arguments of the parties from
the legal conclusions identified by the arbitrators.301
Wales); STRONG & DESNOYER, supra note 48, chs. 4-5 (discussing legal education in the
United States).
291. See STRONG, HOW TO WRITE, supra note 31, at 69, 81.
292. See Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 28. Adjudicative facts are those that are
adduced through evidence at trial. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 201, advisory committee note (a).
293. See Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 28.
294. Id.
295. See Cooper, supra note 221, at 470 (noting the civil lawyer’s need to systematize);
see also ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 67, at 259.
296. See STRONG, HOW TO WRITE, supra note 31, at 42-43 (discussing cases with multi-
ple causes of action and/or multiple party pairings); Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 28.
297. See Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 28-29.
298. See Lloyd et al., supra note 3, at 31.
299. See GEORGE, supra note 73, at 167; Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 29; see also
MAILHOT & CARNWATH, supra note 31, at 51 (noting “if the plaintiff is in favour of a pro-
position the reader can usually infer the defendant is against it.”); supra notes 196-217 and
accompanying text.
300. See GEORGE, supra note 73, at 295; Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 29.
301. See Lloyd et al., supra note 3, at 33.
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Awards generated by appellate arbitration need to include one addi-
tional item, namely a brief description of the appropriate standard of re-
view.302 Debates involving the standard of review will likely increase in
the coming years, since existing rules on arbitral appeals provide little gui-
dance as to what either the scope or the standard of review should be in
arbitration.303
c. Statement of facts (narratio)
All reasoned rulings, be they judicial or arbitral, must include a state-
ment of the relevant facts.304 This is an area where common law and civil
law arbitrators may differ in their approach, since common law lawyers
often see a wider range and number of facts as relevant to the dispute at
hand.305 However, lawyers trained in civil law jurisdictions have long rec-
ognized the importance that factual issues play in legal reasoning, even if
civil law methodology differs from that of the common law.306
A well-written factual analysis “requires an identification of resem-
blances, which we may call positive analogies, and differences, which we
may call negative analogies.”307 Although an arbitrator must include all
the relevant facts, he or she must avoid introducing any unnecessary facts,
since additional elements not only slow the reader down but may cause
confusion about the scope of the legal principle enunciated in the
award.308 As a result, “[o]nly material, adjudicative facts” should be re-
flected in the award.309
To determine what facts are material, an arbitrator must look to the
substantive law controlling that issue.310 Only “facts that might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law” can be considered mate-
rial.311 Focusing on facts “that are truly essential as opposed to those that
302. See Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 30.
303. See supra notes 165-70 and accompanying text.
304. See Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 24; Lloyd et al., supra note 3, at 32.
305. See Fontaine, supra note 3, at 34 (“The summary of the facts will be confined to the
essential points (even though arbitrators from common law countries tend to lend particular
weight to this part of the award), taking a stand on any disputed points.”).
306. See Baudenbacher, supra note 238, at 348-49 (discussing the hermeneutical nature
of contemporary civil law analysis); see also supra notes 220-21 and accompanying text.
307. ALDISERT, supra note 261, at 136.
308. See Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 31.
309. Id.
310. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (considering materiality
in the context of a motion for summary judgment). Different jurisdictions may adopt differ-
ent definitions as to the materiality of a certain issue. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd.,
130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010), Br. of the Int’l Chamber of Commerce et al. as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Resp’ts, at 24 (noting the different definitions of materiality under U.S. and Swiss
law).
311. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248 (considering materiality in the context of a
motion for summary judgment); see also Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999); Willis
v. Roche Biomedical Lab., Inc., 61 F.3d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1995); Buirkle v. Hanover Ins. Co.,
832 F. Supp. 2d. 469, 471-73, 489 (D. Mass. 1993); People v. White, 308 N.W.2d 128, 131-32
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are decorative and adventitious” allows the “conclusion . . . to follow so
naturally and inevitably as almost to prove itself.”312
When summarizing the facts, arbitrators must ensure the accuracy of
each individual element.313 “While the author may interpret the law liber-
ally or strictly, he [or she] must not take this kind of liberty with the
facts.”314 As a result, arbitrators should avoid adopting any proposed find-
ings of facts submitted by the parties, both to minimize error and to pre-
vent claims that the arbitrator did not exercise independent judgment
when reviewing the facts.315
When describing the material facts, an arbitrator needs to do more
than simply recount the evidence.316 Instead, the award must “set out ex-
press findings of fact showing how the . . . [arbitrator] reasoned from the
evidentiary facts to the ultimate fact” that decides a particular legal is-
sue.317 While experts often suggest a chronological approach to the factual
analysis, some disputes lend themselves to another type of organizational
structure.318
If witnesses testified at the hearing, the arbitrator should address is-
sues of credibility.319 However, the award does not need to list all of the
witnesses who have appeared.320 Instead, it is sufficient to “identify the
undisputed facts and make findings of those in dispute, all within the ru-
bric of pertinence. It is important to make findings of credibility when
establishing the probative force of a witness’ testimony, and to give
reasons.”321
(Mich. 1981); ALDISERT, supra note 261, at 137. For examples from both U.S. and English
law, ALDISERT, supra note 261, at 139-40 (discussing Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) L.R. 3 H.L.
330 (HL), and Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
312. Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 31-32 (quoting Benjamin N. Cardozo, Law and
Literature, 14 YALE L.J. 705 (1925)); see also ALDISERT, supra note 261, at 138-40. In some
ways, the task of deciding what constitutes a material versus non-material fact is not as diffi-
cult as it seems, since an arbitrator has been considering those issues throughout the proceed-
ings. See GEORGE, supra note 73, at 232 (noting the “definition of what is and is not [legally]
at issue . . . determines the evidence to be presented and limits what will be heard” at trial.).
313. See Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 33.
314. GEORGE, supra note 73, at 164.
315. See United States v. El Paso 376 U.S. 651, 656-57 (1964); United States v. Crescent
Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 184-85 (1944); Bright v. Westmoreland Cty, 380 F.3d 729, 731-
32 (3d Cir. 2004); GEORGE, supra note 73, at 187. Commentators have cautioned against
“judicial plagiarism,” which occurs when a judge does not give proper credit for a particular
statement or proposition. Id. at 707-27. Arbitrators could be subject to a similar charge if
they copy parties’ proposals too closely.
316. See GEORGE, supra note 73, at 194-95.
317. Id. at 195 (discussing an example). The arbitrator “must formulate the ultimate or
conclusionary fact by scrutinizing the evidentiary facts.” Id. (discussing judicial practices).
318. See MAILHOT & CARNWATH, supra note 31, at 48.
319. See id. at 50.
320. See id.
321. Id.
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Some authorities believe that the summary of facts should precede the
summary of legal issues, although there is no consensus on that point.322
Ultimately, the order of the various sections is a matter of logic and indi-
vidual preference.323 However, most experts suggest writing the summary
of legal issues before writing the summary of facts so as to avoid the intro-
duction of immaterial factual information.324 Sections can be rearranged
later, during the editing process.325
d. Analysis of the legal issues (confirmatio a. confutatio)
The fourth section of a classically constructed award involves a de-
tailed analysis of the legal issues and describes why the arbitrator has
reached the outcome in question.326 Some authorities refer to this as the
“application” section, since this is the place where the law that has been
identified in the legal summary is applied to the facts.327
Arbitrators can organize this section in a variety of ways, depending
on the nature of the dispute. For example, if one issue can be considered
dispositive, then the arbitrator may want to begin by addressing that ele-
ment.328 Alternatively, if no single issue controls the outcome, then the
arbitrator could adopt the organizational approach used by counsel or be-
gin with either the easiest or the most difficult of the outstanding issues,
whichever seems best.329 Regardless of which technique is used, “[t]here is
but one obligation: to correctly describe the arguments in support of each
party’s position on each issue, and to give clear reasons justifying the
result.”330
322. See Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 24. One expert suggests that “[f]acts should
be stated in the past tense” while “[p]ropositions of law should be stated in the present
tense,” but that does not appear to be a hard and fast rule. GEORGE, supra note 73, at 163.
323. See Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 28.
324. See MAILHOT & CARNWATH, supra note 31, at 45-47; Aldisert et al., supra note
109, at 28.
325. See Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 28, 33. Editing is as important as writing. See
MAILHOT & CARNWATH, supra note 31, at 84 (suggesting judges revise their draft texts some-
where between three and eight times).
326. See Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 34.
327. See Lloyd et al., supra note 3, at 33. This technique is reminiscent of the legal
writing methodology used in the United States, England and Australia. See STRONG, HOW TO
WRITE, supra note 31, chs. 3-6 (discussing the IRAC (issue-rule-application-conclusion) sys-
tem in the United States); STRONG & DESNOYER, supra note 48, chs. 3-6 (discussing the
CLEO (claim-law-evaluation-outcome) system in England); Atkinson, supra note 261, at 3-5
(discussing FLAC (facts-law-application-conclusion) in Australia).
328. See MAILHOT & CARNWATH, supra note 31, at 51.
329. Id.
330. Id.; see also GEORGE, supra note 73, at 172 (noting each issue discussed requires a
separate conclusion); MAILHOT & CARNWATH, supra note 31, at 52 (noting “reasons are the
foundation of the result, a form of justification”).
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When drafting an award, an arbitrator needs to be aware of the vari-
ous ways that reasoned awards differ from written advocacy.331 For exam-
ple, reasoned awards
resemble[ ] a form of justification. . . . [Arbitrators] are not re-
quired to convince, but rather to make themselves understood.
They must therefore express their reasons in a fashion that will
carry with them the support of the majority of the readers. The
losing parties may never be convinced their cause was wrong but
they are entitled to know why they lost and how the judge reached
that result.332
Experts suggest that arbitrators adopt a thoughtful and neutral tone so
as to give the parties reason to trust in the integrity of the award.333 Arbi-
trators also should be careful about adopting any proposed conclusions of
law submitted by a party, since that may cause the losing party to have
doubts about the independence and impartiality of the arbitrator.334
Functionally, arbitrators “must decide all the issues in a case on the
basis of general principles that have legal relevance; . . . and the opinion
justifying the decision should contain a full statement of those princi-
ples.”335 Although “[t]he legal conclusion should cover each of the legal
elements required to decide the case,”336 the goal is not to “state the law
[as] fully and comprehensively . . . as might be expected in writing a law
review” or “to resolve unasked questions or legal issues not yet in dis-
pute.”337 Furthermore, a well-drafted legal analysis “should not be a reci-
tation of the case [or statutory] authorities, but rather their specific
application to the precise issues raised by the case.”338 “In drawing a legal
331. MAILHOT & CARNWATH, supra note 31, at 52.
332. Id.; see also ALDISERT, supra note 261, at 157-66 (discussing inductive and deduc-
tive reasoning).
333. See Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 34; Fontaine, supra note 3, at 36-37. Arbitra-
tors may also need to discuss any concurring or dissenting opinions. See Arroyo, supra note
119, at 459-64. While some authors address their colleagues’ concerns in the body of the
award (a step that may be necessary if the analysis of the dissent or concurrence is quite
long), it is also possible to address these matters in the footnotes.
334. See GEORGE, supra note 73, at 187-88; William W. Park, Arbitrator Integrity: The
Transient and the Permanent, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 629, 635-38 (2009); Rogers, Vocation,
supra note 21, at 987-88.
335. Kent Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Legal Principles, 78 COLUM. L.
REV. 982, 990 (1978); see also Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 36.
336. GEORGE, supra note 73, at 195.
337. Id. at 13. But see supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text. Indeed, it is generally
considered “improper for the . . . [arbitrator] to state more in a decision/opinion than is
necessary or to resolve or attempt to resolve future problems.” GEORGE, supra note 73, at 13;
see also id. at 233-34 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of so-called “lecturing”
decisions).
338. GEORGE, supra note 73, at 195.
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conclusion it is important to identify the factual elements necessary to sup-
port that conclusion.”339
When undertaking a legal analysis, an arbitrator faces three possible
scenarios.340 First, after “identify[ing] the flash point of the conflict,” the
arbitrator may find him or herself required to “choose among competing
legal precepts to determine which should control.”341 Here, the arbitrator
needs to identify a controlling principle from a series of cases or stat-
utes.342 Once the controlling principle of law is determined, that principle
must then be interpreted and applied to the facts of the case.343
In the second scenario, the arbitrator may not have any difficulties
identifying which of several competing legal principles controls the issue
but may nevertheless need to decide how to interpret that principle.344
This type of concern arises most frequently in cases involving statutory
construction.345 In this situation, the arbitrator does not need to discuss
other potential legal principles at length but can focus on the interpreta-
tion of the law and the application of that law to the facts.346
The third alternative arises when the dispute is primarily factual in
nature. When faced with these kinds of situations, the bulk of the analysis
will involve describing and weighing the evidence.347 Once that task is
complete, the arbitrator can apply the governing law (as chosen and inter-
preted) to the facts that have been established.348
As the preceding suggests, different types of disputes not only demand
different types of analyses but also generate different type of awards.349 In
deciding how best to draft an award, an international arbitrator must not
339. Id. at 234.
340. These scenarios are reminiscent of Cardozo’s taxonomy of legal disputes, although
the two analyses are not identical. See supra notes 195-217 and accompanying text.
341. Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 35.
342. See id. For example, an arbitrator faced with a question governed by the law of a
common law jurisdiction must study the various authorities, which each announce “a specific
rule of law attached to a detailed set of facts.” Id. Some commentators suggest that this
process allows an adjudicator “to ‘find’ or create a broader legal precept attached to a broad
set of facts.” Id.; see also GEORGE, supra note 73, at 349-68; DEBORAH B. MCGREGOR &
CYNTHIA M. ADAMS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER’S GUIDE TO LEGAL ANALYSIS AND
COMMUNICATION IN THE UNITED STATES 142-91 (2008). Although this process may appear
problematic to lawyers trained in the civil law tradition, Justice Cardozo has explained how
the common law method complies with certain notions of natural law and is indeed consis-
tent with certain readings of the civil law approach to statutory interpretation. See CARDOZO,
supra note 195, at 142-45 (citing FRANÇOIS GÉNY, MÉTHODE D’INTERPRÉTATION ET
SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVÉ POSITIF, vol. II (1919)).
343. See Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 35.
344. See id.
345. See id. A number of common law jurisdictions have become increasingly codified.
See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 5-7 (1982) (discussing
the United States).
346. See Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 35.
347. See id. at 35-36.
348. See id. at 36.
349. See also supra notes 195-228 and accompanying text.
Fall 2015] Reasoned Awards 53
be afraid of exercising his or her judgment and discretion.350 However,
arbitrators “must not rely on value judgments to the exclusion of reasoned
analysis.”351 Furthermore, the award must “not be written as a record of
the tribunal’s internal deliberations but for consumption by those for
whom it is intended.”352
e. Conclusion indicating the holding or disposition (peroratio)
The final section of a reasoned award involves the holding or disposi-
tion of the dispute.353 In judicial opinions, this section usually constitutes
“a single paragraph or sentence at the end” of the award.354 Arbitral
awards usually require a slightly lengthier conclusion, since the issue of
fees and costs usually must be addressed in addition to the outcome of the
various substantive claims.355 Notably, if the issue of fees and costs is at all
contentious, it may merit a special subsection following the legal analysis
and prior to the conclusion.356
The dispositive section of the award is usually relatively formulaic so
as to avoid any possible misunderstandings.357 Arbitrators must be sure to
address all alleged claims and defenses, since the doctrine of functus of-
ficio may make it difficult if not impossible to go back and address any
gaps that have been left.358 As a result, it is often considered a best prac-
tice to conclude the award with a provision stating that all matters not
explicitly addressed in the award have been considered and determined to
be without merit.359
Appellate arbitrators may be required to identify which aspects of the
initial award have been affirmed, reversed, vacated, and/or modified, al-
though at this point very little analysis exists regarding the scope of an
appellate arbitrator’s powers.360 However, existing appellate rules suggest
that appellate arbitrators do not have the power to remand a matter to the
original tribunal.361
350. Arbitrators have long been selected for their ability to exercise appropriate
discretion.
351. Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 37.
352. Lloyd, supra note 3, at 40.
353. See Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 24.
354. GEORGE, supra note 73, at 176.
355. See Lloyd et al., supra note 3, at 35-37.
356. See id. at 34-35. Fee-related issues in international commercial arbitration can be-
come quite complicated and could require detailed submissions regarding the allocation of
costs, interest and attorneys’ fees. See id. In those cases, the discussion of fees and costs can
run several pages in length and should be analyzed in a separate section in the award. See id.
357. See id. at 34-37 (including model language).
358. See Gaitis, supra note 9, at 12.
359. See Aldisert et al., supra note 109, at 38.
360. See GEORGE, supra note 73, at 302-04; Aldisert et al., supra note 109 at 38.
361. See AAA Appellate Rules, supra note 86, at Rule A-19(a) (“The appeal tribunal
may not order a new arbitration hearing or send the case back to the original arbitrator(s) for
corrections or further review.”); CPR Appellate Rules, supra note 86, at Rule 8.2(b) (“The
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The conclusion should also include any formalities that are required as
a matter of national or international law.362 Thus, for example, an award
should be signed by all arbitrators (or at least a majority thereof if a dis-
sent exists) and should include both the date and the place of
arbitration.363
CONCLUSION
As the preceding discussion suggests, writing a reasoned award is one
of the most important and challenging tasks that an international arbitra-
tor must undertake. Not only do international awards typically reflect the
same degree of analytical complexity as many judicial decisions, they also
require a uniquely international perspective that is very difficult to master.
Learning to overcome the allure of parochialism and incorporate key ele-
ments of both the common law and the civil law legal traditions into one’s
legal analysis is something that requires a great deal of skill and train-
ing.364 Unfortunately, the arbitral community has adopted the view that
international arbitrators can become competent in award writing simply
through “observation, exposure, participation and experience.”365
To some extent, this highly deferential approach to arbitral education
would appear unassailable, since it strongly resembles the standard means
by which many common law jurisdictions have educated their judges.366
However, experts have expressed a number of concerns about the efficacy
of the common law approach to judicial education, thereby raising similar
questions about the nature and quality of arbitral education, particularly
with respect to award-writing.367
The current approach to arbitral education has also been defended on
the grounds that market forces will ensure the requisite degree of compe-
tence in writing international awards.368 The hypothesis is that good arbi-
trators—meaning those that can and do comply with national and
international requirements regarding reasoned awards and who reflect an
Tribunal does not have the power to remand the award.”); JAMS Appellate Rules, supra
note 86, at Procedure D (“The Panel may not remand to the original Arbitrator(s) . . . .”).
362. See Lloyd, supra note 3, at 41; Lloyd et al., supra note 3, at 37.
363. See Lloyd et al., supra note 3, at 37 (suggesting the phrase “Place of Arbitration”
should be used to designate the arbitral seat rather than the more archaic “Done at”).
364. McGill University in Canada is one of the few institutions that teaches law on a
transsystemic basis. See Bédard, supra note 11, at 239; see also McGill University, Paul-André
Crépeau Centre for Private and Comparative Law, http://www.mcgill.ca/centre-crepeau/
transsystemic/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2016).
365. See Jones, supra note 19, at 281.
366. See Strong, Judicial Education, supra note 23, at 2-5; supra note 38 and accompa-
nying text.
367. See Strong, Judicial Education, supra note 23, at 2-5; THOMAS, supra note 260, at
113.
368. See Daphna Kapeliuk, The Repeat Appointment Factor: Exploring Decision Pat-
terns of Elite Investment Arbitrators, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 47, 62 (2010). However, it is also
likely that market forces and concerns about predictability will limit the number of arbitra-
tors who are chosen on a regular basis. See id. at 68.
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appropriately international perspective in their analyses—will be re-
warded through repeat appointments, while those arbitrators who do not
rise to the task of drafting an adequate award will eventually find them-
selves without jobs.369 However, this argument breaks down in several
ways. First, commentators have long recognized that the lack of trans-
parency in international commercial arbitration can allow sub-standard ar-
bitrators to continue to work for a significant period of time.370 Second,
experts have noted that that “no selection method can guarantee the con-
tinued fitness” of an adjudicator.371 Indeed, many judges “turn out to be
ill-suited for the job,” despite having complied with selection procedures
that are ostensibly more rigorous than those facing international
arbitrators.372
As it turns out, there are a number of ways to improve the skills of
international arbitrators. One is to increase the number and quality of ed-
ucational opportunities concerning award-writing in international com-
mercial arbitration.373 In so doing, the arbitral community can consider
some of the recent innovations in judicial education to see what types of
improvements are possible on both a procedural and substantive level.374
For example, educational providers can combine in-person sessions with
written guidebooks so as to take the particular needs and learning style of
international arbitrators into account.375
Another possibility is to create more rigorous standards regarding ar-
bitrator education, such as by imposing a mandatory minimum regarding
the number or type of courses a new or experienced arbitrator should
take.376 Similar initiatives have met with significant resistance in the judi-
cial context on the grounds that such measures were somehow “insulting,”
and similar types of objections can be anticipated in the arbitral con-
text.377 However, mandatory minimums in arbitrator education would be
369. See id. at 62 (applying a law and economics approach to arbitrator appointment);
Rogers, Transparency, supra note 65, at 1316-17.
370. See Susan D. Franck, The Role of International Arbitrators, 12 ILSA J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 499, 516-17 & n.75 (2006). One particularly noteworthy effort to overcome lack of
transparency in international commercial arbitration involves Arbitrator Intelligence, a new
database developed by Professor Catherine Rogers to provide parties in arbitration with ac-
curate information on arbitrators and arbitral awards. See Arbitrator Intelligence, http://
www.arbitratorintelligence.org/.
371. Wayne Doane, Note, The Membership of Judges in Gender Discriminatory Clubs,
12 VT. L. REV. 459, 461 (1987); see also Keith R. Fisher, Education for Judicial Aspirants, 54
AKRON L. REV. 163, 164 (2010).
372. Fisher, supra note 371, at 164.
373. See supra notes 13-36 and accompanying text.
374. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
375. See ARMYTAGE, supra note 34, at 149; see also supra note 36 and accompanying
text.
376. See David Lord Hacking, Ethics, Elitism, Eligibility: A Response – What Happens if
the Icelandic Arbitrator Falls Through the ICC? 15 J. INT’L ARB. 73, 78 (1998).
377. See National Judicial Education Program, Testimony to the ABA Joint Commission
to Evaluate the Model Code of Judicial Conduct 15 (Apr. 2004), http://www.americanbar.org/
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consistent with other efforts to improve the quality of international com-
mercial arbitration.378 Furthermore, mandatory education would help
overcome the fact that those individuals who are most in need of addi-
tional training are often the least likely to recognize that need.379
At this point, international commercial arbitration is considered to be
one of the legal world’s most remarkable success stories,380 and nothing in
this Article should be taken as criticizing the excellent work done by the
large majority of international arbitrators. Indeed, studies suggest that
most observers and participants appear satisfied with decision-making in
international commercial arbitration.381 However, the arbitral community
must continue to be vigilant if international commercial arbitration is to
retain its position as the preferred method of resolving cross-border busi-
ness disputes.382 One of the best ways of ensuring the continued excel-
lence of international commercial arbitration is to ensure the quality of
reasoned awards. While it is not recommended that the international arbi-
tral community attempt to adopt a single standard approach to award writ-
ing, new and experienced arbitrators would undoubtedly benefit from an
improved understanding of what is involved in a reasoned award.383
Hopefully this Article has proven useful in that regard.
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